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Restorative Justice for
Multinational Corporations
ANDREW BRADY SPALDING*
Deterrence theory, rooted in the methodology of law and economics,
continues to dominate both the theory and practice of white-collar crime. By
manipulating the disincentives of prospective wrongdoers, deterrence aims to
efficiently reduce crime and maximize taxpayers' utility. However, the rise of
international commerce presents a challenge it cannot meet. Using a
combination of empirical evidence and quantitative modeling, this Article
shows that deterrence will tend to increase, rather than decrease, net levels
of corporate crime in developing countries.
The ever-increasing power of multinational corporations thus calls for a new
theory of punishment, one that uses criminal enforcement to address the
systemic causes of crime. That theory, quite ironically, is restorative justice.
By involving the perpetrator, victim, and community in the sentencing
process, restorative justice does not merely punish the wrongdoer, but
remedies the harm caused by the crime, prevents future harm, and
reintegrates the defendant into the very community it violated. Though
generally thought to apply only to the traditional crimes of natural persons,
this Article demonstrates that the U.S. Constitution and Sentencing
Guidelines already authorize corporate sentencing practices rooted in
restorative justice principles. More to the point, for two decades the U.S.
Department of Justice has quietly been implementing restorative justice
principles in domestic white-collar environmental sentencing. Drawing on
those precedents, this Article builds a model for extraterritorial white-collar
criminal punishment that advances the interests of U.S. corporations and
enforcement agencies alike, benefits the overseas victims of corporate crime,
and requires no new legal authorization to implement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A multinational corporation (MNC) with a U.S. nexus commits a white-
collar crime overseas. Perhaps it bribes foreign officials for business purposes,
or willfully violates trade sanctions; either way, it knowingly profits from the
illegal exploitation of relatively weak foreign governments. The U.S.
Department of Justice imposes a criminal fine in the tens or hundreds of
millions of dollars, and publicly touts the achievement.' But where does that
money go?
Those millions are deposited directly in the U.S. treasury, 2 where they
finance U.S. government programs and reduce the federal deficit. But the
principal victims of that crime-the citizens of the government whose
weakness the MNC exploited for personal gain-are scarcely helped at all.
Owing to a peculiar but inherent quirk in extraterritorial white-collar criminal
law, enforcement revenues accrue only to the perpetrator's public fisc.
1 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Alcoa World Alumina Agrees to
Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery and Pay $223 Million in Fines and Forfeiture (Jan. 9,2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/January/1 4-crm-0 1 9.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/CRQ8-CHFH ("The law does not permit companies to avoid
responsibility for foreign corruption by outsourcing bribery to their agents, and, as today's
prosecution demonstrates, neither will the Department of Justice." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries
Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in
Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/2008/December/08-crm-1 105.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WVV7-WEVZ ("The
[government] will continue to ... ensure that the corporate and business communities are
not tarnished with violations of the kind we are presenting here today." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
2 See 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2012).
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We may seek consolation in the doctrine of general deterrence, the
supposed "holy grail" of criminal punishment. 3 By this logic, though the
penalty money sits in U.S. coffers, it deters prospective violators from further
criminal conduct.4 The problem is that it will not work.
However effective deterrence may (or may not) be in reducing crime
domestically,5 in extraterritorial white-collar enforcement it is doomed to fail:
it will tend to increase net crime levels in the very countries whose social
conditions we seek to improve. If our goal is to reduce crime-and it often
is6-we therefore need an alternative theory of criminal punishment; one that
can better address the conditions of international commerce than deterrence
ever could.
This Article provides that theory. Quite ironically, it is restorative justice:
an approach to criminal punishment whereby the victims, community, and
perpetrator all participate in diagnosing the causes of the criminal act,
determining the appropriate punishment, and seeking the defendant's
reintegration into the very community whose norms it once violated.7 And to
those who may retort that restorative justice does not and could not apply to
large-scale corporate crime, my answer may be surprising: it already does. The
"Sentencing of Organizations" chapter of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (the
Guidelines) 8 authorizes, if not encourages, sentencing procedures founded on
restorative justice principles. Moreover, federal sentencing practices do now,
and have for several decades, applied those principles to a specific area of
federal white-collar enforcement: domestic environmental law.9 The only
remaining task is to adapt this practice to extraterritorial white-collar
enforcement. 10
Accordingly, Part II explains deterrence theory, its grounding in the
methodology of law and economics, and its status as the dominant
contemporary theory of criminal punishment. It then proposes using anti-
3 Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of
Globalization, 91 IOWA L. REv. 505, 515 (2006).
4 See, e.g., John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1037, 1039 (2009); Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2385,
2386 (1997); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public
Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 45 (2000); George J. Stigler, The
Optimum Enforcement ofLaws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 526 (1970).
5 See, e.g., Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal
Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 766 (2010).
6 See infra Part II.B.
7 See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION
11 (2002); UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, HANDBOOK ON RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE PROGRAMMES 6 (2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal
justice/06-56290 Ebook.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8FDC-3DS5.
8 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2014).
9 See infra Part IV.A.
10 See infra Part IV.C.
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bribery law, particularly the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,I1 as a kind of
case study in federal extraterritorial deterrence, and explains why the FCPA
serves this purpose well.1 2 Using empirical evidence on the FCPA's impact
overseas, Part III builds a model to show why deterrence will tend to fail more
generally in extraterritorial white-collar enforcement. It explains the unique
conditions of international business and illustrates how these conditions will
often produce an increase, rather than a decrease, in overseas crime. Part IV
then shows restorative justice to be a superior, if counterintuitive, paradigm for
extraterritorial white-collar enforcement. It develops a new sentencing
procedure that would promote the interests of the federal enforcement
agencies, help the overseas victims of corporate crime, and require no new
legal authorization to implement.
II. DETERRENCE THEORY, PURE AND PROUD
Modern deterrence theory, with its underpinnings in law and economics,
posits a rational enforcement authority that manipulates the cost-benefit trade-
offs for prospective offenders to efficiently reduce crime. This section shows
how the theory has remained largely unscathed despite two lines of potential
criticism. It then introduces anti-bribery law as a case study in extraterritorial
white-collar deterrence that illustrates deterrence's unintended and troubling
consequences in foreign jurisdictions.
A. Law and Economics'Rational Enforcement Authority
The watershed work on public law enforcement in the law and economics
paradigm is A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell's The Economic Theory
of the Public Enforcement of Law.13 They explain that to the law and
economics way of thinking, social welfare generally is presumed to equal the
sum of individuals' expected utilities. An individual's expected utility
essentially depends on four variables: whether she commits a harmful act,
whether she is sanctioned (by fine, imprisonment, or both), whether she is a
11 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494,
amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 and by International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
12 This Article is the culmination of a long-term research project exploring the impact
of federal business law generally, and anti-bribery law specifically, on developing
countries. Previous installments include the following: Andrew Brady Spalding,
Corruption, Corporations, and the New Human Right, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1365 (2014)
[hereinafter Spalding, Corruption]; Andrew Brady Spalding, The Irony of International
Business Law: US. Progressivism and China's New Laissez-Faire, 59 UCLA L. REV. 354
(2011) [hereinafter Spalding, The Irony]; Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions:
Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging
Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351 (2010) [hereinafter Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions].13 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 4.
360 [Vol. 76:2
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
victim of someone else's harmful act, and on her tax payment (which will
reflect the costs of law enforcement, less any fine revenue collected).14
The individual thus wears two hats in the utility calculation: as potential
wrongdoer, and as potential victim. The potential victim's two variables-
whether she is a victim and the extent of her taxes-are of course closely
interconnected. Recognizing her potential victimization, she pays taxes to
prevent it. The purpose of funding crime enforcement with her own taxes,
then, is to prevent the disutility of victimization. The paradigm thus assumes
that we pay taxes to increase our individual utility; were there no threat of
victimization, the individual would have no reason to pay taxes. There'd be no
utility in it; not faced with the threatened disutility of falling victim, her utility
would not be maximized by paying taxes to finance public criminal law
enforcement. The potential victims are taxpayers; the taxpayers are potential
victims.
The "enforcement authority's problem" then is to maximize social welfare
by finding the most efficient combination of the four key enforcement
variables mentioned above: enforcement expenditures, the level of the fine, the
length of imprisonment, and the standard for imposing liability.15 The
disutility of crime is weighed against the cost of prevention, and the aim is to
reduce crime with maximal cost-efficiency. The enforcement authority should
expend only so much on enforcement as is necessary to reduce the disutility
for the taxpayer.
Following Cesare Beccaria's admonition that it is "better to prevent crimes
than to punish them,"16 law and economics seeks to deter crime by ensuring
that the cost of punishment to a potential wrongdoer exceeds the rewards.' 7
The core assumption of deterrence is that potential wrongdoers will decide
against the commission of a criminal act based on the fear of sanctions or
punishment.18 It assumes that the potential (and perhaps hypothetical)
wrongdoer calculates the utility of crime based on the benefits and costs of the
criminal act as well as the benefits and costs of abstaining. The attributes of
punishment that can be manipulated to maintain the proper cost-benefit ratio
are its certainty, severity, and celerity (or swiftness).1 9 If set appropriately, the
potential violator will succumb to deterrence because a rational choice would
never result in the commission of a crime; the cost would prove too high in
14 Id. at 48.
15Id. at 48-49.
16 See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 93 (Henry Paolucci trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill Educ. Publ'g 1963) (1764).
7 GEORGE B. VOLD ET AL., THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 196-97 (5th ed. 2002).
18 Paternoster, supra note 5, at 766.
191d. at 783.
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comparison to the perceived benefit.20 Punishment is said to have a deterrent
effect when the fear or actual imposition of punishment leads to conformity. 21
The paradigm remains largely unfazed by the potential problem of
criminal overdeterrence. In civil law, by contrast, the cost of overdeterrence is
well-recognized: 22 if the penalty for causing a car accident were $1 million,
people would cease driving.23 But for the kinds of intentional acts generally
proscribed by criminal law, the risk of discouraging socially productive
behavior, or of encouraging destructive behavior, is negligible. Because the
goal is to achieve effective deterrence by setting punishment at a sufficiently
high level to dissuade potential offenders, the "temptation to impose
increasingly harsher penalties is strong." 24 The optimal level of intentional (as
opposed to negligent) criminal conduct, generally speaking, is therefore zero.
But scholars have, perhaps somewhat indirectly, addressed the problem of
overdeterrence in two ways. These concern the risk that deterring a particular
crime might increase the incidence of other crimes. The first is the problem of
marginal deterrence: setting equally high penalties for crimes of unequal
severity will tend to encourage the more severe crime. As George Stigler
famously put it, "If the thief has his hand cut off for taking five dollars, he had
just as well take $5,000."25 Where the overall level of criminality might be
understood as the number of crimes committed multiplied by their severity,
disproportionate penalties for relatively mild criminal acts will remove the
disincentive to engage in more serious crimes and thus increase overall levels
of criminality.
The second is based on Neal Katyal's research on substitution. Katyal held
that the public enforcement agency must consider how penalizing a given
crime may increase the appeal of alternative, or substitute, crimes. An increase
in the "price" of one crime may cause potential wrongdoers to substitute
criminal act X with criminal act Y or Z.26 Accordingly, though enforcing the
prohibition on X may well deter X, it may also increase the incidence of Y or
Z.27 For both of these problems, the effort to deter a given crime has produced
20 See VOLD ET AL., supra note 17, at 196.
2 1 TERANCE D. MIETHE & HONG Lu, PUNISHMENT: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 20 (2005).
2 2 See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.10 (8th ed. 2011)
(describing the theory of optimal tort damages). For a discussion of civil punitive damages
that violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-28 (2003).23 Bronsteen et al., supra note 4, at 1056 n. 100.24 d. at 1055-56. The overdeterrence problem can arise with negligence crimes;
negligent vehicular homicide would raise the same overdeterrence problems as the civil
example above, such that the optimal level of such homicides may be greater than zero.
25 Stigler, supra note 4, at 527.
26 Katyal, supra note 4, at 2387.
27 The enforcement authority's inclination to inflict an increasingly severe punishment
may be further restrained in two ways. First, the enforcement costs must be no greater than
is necessary to achieve the optimal level of deterrence. These costs would take two forms.
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the collateral harm of an increase in another form of crime. But scholarship on
the substitution problem, like marginal deterrence, would hardly constitute an
attack on the essential theory.
Scholars have gained somewhat more traction attacking the practice of
deterrence. The core theory has given rise to a number of hypotheses that
empiricists continue to test. Questions remain concerning to what extent an
increase in the objective costs of punishment to a potential wrongdoer,
particularly length of sentence, will decrease the incidence of crime; to what
extent increasing enforcement resources will increase certainty and celerity;
and whether objective increases in certainty, severity, or celerity will produce
a proportional increase in the subjective perceptions of those attributes among
wrongdoers and therefore exert a downward push on crime, etc.28
But note that these are questions of degree; while we do not know whether
deterrence "works very well," 29 we know it works. The empirical evidence
indeed demonstrates that deterrence measures succeed-however
imperfectly-in reducing crime. Actors subject to the jurisdiction of a law that
penalizes a given form of conduct with the requisite degree of certainty,
severity, and celerity will engage in less of that conduct. We know this, and
we might call it the upside of deterrence.
And notice the corollary: if we know that actors subject to a criminal
prohibition will engage in less of that conduct, we also know that actors not so
subject will engage in more of it. Applied to white-collar enforcement,
companies subject to the criminal prohibition on a particular form of profitable
but socially undesirable conduct will engage in less of that conduct than
companies that are not so subject; companies not subject to that prohibition
will engage, relatively speaking, in more of that conduct. This is the downside
of deterrence's upside. To clarify, what I am here calling the downside is not a
consequence of its upside; it is merely a logical corollary that will prove
important in the analysis below. And in international business, governed by
the extraterritorial application of criminal laws, where the law's stated object
is to deter overseas crime, the downside proves tricky.
Most obvious are the costs of detecting, trying, and imprisoning a criminal, which are of
course substantial. Bronsteen et al., supra note 4, at 1056-57. Under the logic of
deterrence, they cannot become excessively so, lest the taxpayers' disutility exceeds the
risk of victimization. Id. But additionally, society incurs the opportunity cost of removing
potentially productive individuals from society through imprisonment, a factor that is (from
a narrowly economic perspective) especially pronounced in white-collar crime. Id. In
addition to these social costs, utilitarianism would value the welfare (though not the rights)
of the defendant; he need not suffer any greater a punishment than is necessary for
deterrence purposes. Id.28 See Paternoster, supra note 5, at 787-818.
2 9 d. at 766; see DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION:
RECONSIDERING THE PROSPECT OF SANCTION 9 (2009).
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B. A Case Study in Extraterritorial Deterrence: Anti-Bribery Law
For three reasons, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act30 is well-suited to
illustrate the unanticipated consequences of extraterritorial white-collar
enforcement. First, it is perhaps the clearest case of a federal statute
criminalizing extraterritorial white-collar conduct that, by all indications,
Congress intended as a tool for improving overseas legal institutions. I have
made that argument elsewhere at some length,31 and will only summarize it
briefly here.
The legislative history makes abundantly clear that Congress sought to
increase transparency specifically and improve market conditions generally in
developing countries through the FCPA. Congressional deliberations on the
need for an extraterritorial anti-bribery statute in the 1970s were initially
precipitated by the discovery that the Lockheed Corporation, the flagship U.S.
defense contractor, had paid bribes to government officials in Japan, the
Netherlands, and Italy to win bids.32
Each of these countries was thought critical to the growth of democratic
institutions, and revelations of corporate bribery undermined liberalism's
credibility. Congressman Stephen Solarz, a Democrat from New York, argued
in Congress that Lockheed's payments to Japanese officials put .' [t]he
democratic system in Japan ... in grave danger."' 33 Opponents within Japan
of that country's alliance with the U.S. were handed what he called:
[A] terribly effective weapon to drive a wedge between two close allies. At a
time of uncertainty due to the shifting balances of power in Asia, our
strongest and most stable ally in the region [was] undergoing unnecessary
turbulence, and [a] relationship which is at the very heart of our foreign
policy [was] potentially jeopardized. 34
Solarz thought the "most serious" and "delicate" situation was Italy, which
was "one of the keys to the southern flank of NATO" and whose government
was equally split between a liberal party and the Communist Party.35 He noted
30 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
31 Portions of the following analysis previously appeared in Spalding, Corruption,
supra note 12, at 1375-79; Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions, supra note 12, at 357-60.
32 See WILLIAM D. HARTUNG, PROPHETS OF WAR: LOCKHEED MARTIN AND THE
MAKING OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 115-32 (2011).
33 Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong.
172 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Protection Hearings] (statement of Rep. Stephen S. Solarz)
(quoting "[a] very senior politician close to former [Japanese] Prime Minister Takeo
Mike").
34 Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot.
& Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 141 (1976)
[hereinafter 1976 Protection Hearing] (statement of Rep. Stephen S. Solarz).
35 Id
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that "[a]llegations of payments by Lockheed served to advance the Communist
cause in Italy where the Communist bloc was strengthened by the sight of
corrupt capitalism." 36 Congress feared that the Communist Party could gain a
majority in the Italian parliament and the prospects for building democratic
institutions would be lost.37 The implications of corporate bribery for the U.S.
effort to promote the growth of liberal institutions were thus "staggering and in
some cases, perhaps irreversible." 38
The implications that Solarz feared were irreversible concerned the
building of liberal economic and political institutions abroad. The institution-
building view of the FCPA was expressed with some poignancy by Democrat
George Ball, who had become famous as a member of the Kennedy and
Johnson Administrations for his opposition to the Vietnam War. Ball
explained:
The vast volume of speeches, pamphlets, and advertising copy and
propaganda leaflets extolling the virtues of free enterprise are cancelled every
night when managements demonstrate by their conduct that a sector of
multinational business activity is not free; it is bought and paid for. This is a
problem that, like so many others, has relevance in the struggle of
antagonistic ideologies; for, when our enterprises stoop to bribery and
kickbacks, they give substance to the communist myth-already widely
believed in Third World countries-that capitalism is fundamentally
corrupt. 39
Continuing this theme, the Deputy Legal Adviser in the Department of
State under President Ford testified that corruption "jeopardizes the important
interests we share with our friends abroad" because it undermines a form of
government "upon which social progress, economic justice, and perhaps,
ultimately, world peace depends." 40 Treasury Secretary William E. Simon
further stated that it "adversely affect[s] our relations with foreign
governments and can contribute to a general deterioration in the climate for
fair and open international trade and investment." 41 He feared that bribery
36 1977 Protection Hearings, supra note 33, at 173 (statement of Rep. Stephen S.
Solarz).
37 1976 Protection Hearing, supra note 34, at 141.
38 Id. at 2 (statement of John M. Murphy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. &
Fin.).
39 Foreign and Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous.
& Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 41-42 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Senate Banking Hearings]
(statement of George Ball, Senior Managing Director, Lehman Brothers).
40 The Activities of American Multinational Corporations Abroad: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong. 23
(1975) (statement of Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Department
of State).
411976 Senate Banking Hearings, supra note 39, at 85 (statement of William E.
Simon, Secretary, United States Department of the Treasury). Ultimately, President Ford
would formally state that reports of bribery "tend to destroy confidence" in liberal-
democratic institutions. GERALD R. FORD, SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS
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would weaken, rather than strengthen, these legal and economic institutions;
the statute's purpose, plainly, was to strengthen them.
Whether we sought to promote liberal legal and economic institutions
overseas out of concern for those countries, or merely to advance our strategic
interests, is of course debatable. But that is a question of why we should build
institutions through commerce, not whether we should do so. With the
integration of these themes into both the Senate 42 and House43 Reports, the
bipartisan consensus concerning the FCPA's intended effect becomes clear.
The notion that the United States should enforce the bribery prohibition to
wash our hands of overseas corruption, irrespective of its impact on overall
corruption levels, was utterly absent from the deliberations. Rather, Congress
envisioned a statute that would improve the conditions of foreign investment
and, in turn, of global economic and political development, by promoting
efficient, transparent, and relatively bribery-free institutions.
Second, the current FCPA enforcement regime is by all indications rooted
in a deterrence paradigm. The enforcement agencies' principal response to
findings of bribery is an investigation and a substantial fine, often in the
hundreds of millions of dollars. 44 Owing to their limited resources, the
enforcement agencies must rely on publicizing these high-penalty actions to
incentivize compliance among other prospective wrongdoers, thereby
achieving a measure of general deterrence. Whether the enforcement agencies
have adopted this theory of punishment consciously or not is perhaps less
clear, and ultimately beside the point. The regime of selective investigation,
substantial penalty, and deliberate publicizing to the broader community of
similarly situated corporations is quintessential deterrence.
Third, we have empirical evidence on the impact of enforcement on capital
flows into overseas markets. And that evidence raises, but does not quite
answer, questions about how these capital flow changes will impact net
bribery levels. Though I have likewise discussed that evidence at some length
elsewhere,45 it is worth a cursory review here.
Empirical data from multiple sources demonstrate that anti-bribery
enforcement causes companies subject to FCPA jurisdiction to withdraw their
TRANSMITrING PROPOSED FOREIGN PAYMENTS DISCLOsURE LEGISLATION, H.R. Doc. No.
94-572, at 1 (1976). When the Carter Administration moved in, his Treasury Secretary
stated, "[t]he Carter Administration believes that it is damaging both to our country and to
a healthy world economic system for American corporations to bribe foreign officials."
Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Disclosure: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 67 (1977) (statement
of Hon. W. Michael Blumenthal, Secretary, United States Department of the Treasury).
42 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 3-4 (1977).
4 3 H. REP. No. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977).
44 See Richard L. Cassin, Alcoa Lands 5th on Our Top Ten List, FCPA BLOG (Jan. 10,
2014, 1:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/1/10/alcoa-lands-5th-on-our-top-ten-
list.html, archived at http://perma.cc/GHV8-PYX7 (detailing the top ten FCPA
enforcement actions by penalty, ranging from $152 million to $800 million).
45 See Spalding, Corruption, supra note 12, at 1376-81.
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capital from developing countries. This, in turn, creates the very conditions in
which bribery proliferates and illiberal regimes gain influence. Two sets of
economic studies have demonstrated that anti-bribery enforcement causes
corporations subject to its jurisdiction to do less business in bribery-prone
markets. The first, in 1995 by James Hines, focused on the impact of the
FCPA alone, finding that, controlling for other variables, FCPA enforcement
caused a reduction in business in bribery-prone countries. 46 To clarify, the
thesis is not that U.S. companies were investing less overall in developing
countries in 1995 than they were in 1976-indeed, such a conclusion would be
absurd and patently unsupportable. Rather, the finding was that companies did
less business in such countries than they would have if the FCPA did not exist.
This initial study further found that total investment in bribery-prone countries
did not drop; rather, U.S. investment was replaced by investment from
countries without bribery prohibitions.47
A second set of studies conducted after enactment of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention Against
Bribery confirmed the finding that as anti-bribery legislation became more
prevalent, bribery-prone countries received less of their foreign direct
investment (FDI) from OECD nations and more from nations without bribery
prohibitions.48 Professor Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra essentially confirmed and
expanded upon Hines's thesis.49 Cuervo-Cazurra's study was narrower than
Hines's in that he focused exclusively on FDI, but broader in that Cuervo-
Cazurra used data on bilateral FDI inflows from 183 home economies to 106
host economies with varying quantified corruption levels. 50
Cuervo-Cazurra further found that the phenomenon of businesses from
countries with anti-bribery legislation investing less in highly corrupt countries
46 James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and American Business
After 1977, at 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 1995),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5266.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6577-
H8S4.
4 7 See id. at 20.
4 8 Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares About Corruption?, 37 J. INT'L Bus. STUD.
807, 818-19 (2006).
49Id. at 818. Cuervo-Cazurra further noted that Hines's study had become subject to
various methodological disputes. See id. at 808-09 (citing Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing Is
Corruption on International Investors?, 82 REv. ECON. & STAT. 1, 2 (2000)). Cuervo-
Cazurra believed that he had improved upon Hines's methodology and yet confirmed the
results. See id Evaluating these methodologies is not the purpose of this Article. For
further empirical studies confirming FCPA enforcement's negative impact on FDI, see
JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND
REFORM 174-75 (2007); Paul J. Beck et al., The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act on US Exports, 12 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 295, 300 (1991); Anna D'Souza,
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Changing the Currents of Trade, 97 J. DEV. EcON.
73, 79 (2012); Raj ib Sanyal, Effect of Perception of Corruption on Outward U.S. Foreign
Direct Investment, 10 GLOBAL Bus. & ECON. REv. 123, 137 (2008).
50 Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 48, at 811.
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was not limited to the United States. Rather, high levels of corruption in a host
country generally resulted in less FDI from signatories to the OECD
convention. 51 The same phenomenon that Hines identified with respect to the
United States thus became more widespread as a result of the OECD
convention. The underside of the phenomenon that Hines first identified-
countries that are not bound by anti-bribery legislation continue to invest in
corrupt countries-was likewise confirmed by Cuervo-Cazurra. Post-OECD,
as signatory countries invested less in corrupt countries, countries with higher
levels of corruption received relatively more FDI from countries with similarly
higher corruption levels. 52 The result of these trends is that as anti-bribery
legislation became more widespread, corrupt countries received less of their
FDI from less-corrupt countries and more of their FDI from more-corrupt
countries. 53
In a second empirical study, 54 Cuervo-Cazurra verified and restated his
finding that countries which implemented the OECD convention had become
"more sensitive" to corruption and had reduced their FDI in more-corrupt
countries. 55 He then proposed a modification of Hines's original thesis,
concluding that prior to the OECD convention, U.S. investors were not in fact
investing less in corrupt countries, but that they began investing less after
OECD ratification. 56 In other words, the FCPA standing alone did not induce
U.S. investors to invest less in corrupt countries, but rather the OECD induced
both U.S. and other OECD signatories to invest less.57
In addition to this empirical evidence, the historical record teaches that the
U.S. Government formally embraced this very position: that FCPA
enforcement reduced U.S. investment in developing countries. After the
FCPA's enactment in 1977, the U.S. government began lobbying the Western
world to enact a similar prohibition, ultimately succeeding in 1997 with the
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery.58 In testimony before Congress, a
common theme was that the U.S. business community was losing business
overseas as a result of the FCPA. In his message transmitting the convention,
President Bill Clinton noted that the United States "has been alone" in
criminalizing overseas bribery and that "United States corporations have
contended that this has put them at a significant disadvantage in competing for
51 See id at 807-08.
52 Id. at 808.
53 Id
54 Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws Against Bribery Abroad, 39 J.
INT'L Bus. STUD. 634 (2008).
55 Id at 644.
56 Id. at 645.
57 See D'Souza, supra note 49, at 85.
58 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec.
17, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention].
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international contracts with respect to foreign competitors who are not subject
to such laws." 59 Numerous congressmen testified that the convention would
"level[] the playing field," 60 as did SEC Associate Director Paul Gerlach. 61
Ultimately, President Clinton would adopt this metaphor in his signing
statement.6 2 Moreover, the Clinton Administration calculated a very specific
estimate of the amount of business that U.S. corporations were losing.
President Clinton indicated in his signing statement that the value of the
contracts lost to U.S. businesses each year as a result of the FCPA was $30
billion.6 3 The Undersecretary of State64 and the General Counsel of the
Secretary of Commerce65 encompassed the same figure in their testimony. The
argument proved persuasive and the U.S. joined the OECD Convention.
But the empirical studies merely confirm what common sense would
teach: if we increase the costs of conducting business through the FCPA, we
will tend to do less business in corrupt countries. Indeed, this sense is captured
in the accumulation of anecdotal evidence in surveys and congressional
testimony. A 2009 Dow Jones anti-corruption compliance survey announced
in a press release entitled "Confusion About Anti-Corruption Laws Leads
Companies To Abandon Expansion Initiatives," found that 51% of companies
had delayed a business initiative as a result of the FCPA and 14% had
abandoned an initiative altogether. 66 More recently, a 2011 survey by the
accounting firm KPMG found that among executives surveyed in the United
States and the United Kingdom, "[m]ore than 70 percent .. . agreed there are
places in the world where business cannot be done without engaging in bribery
and corruption," and that approximately 30% of the respondents indicated that
they deal with this risk by not doing business in certain countries.6 7
59 Id. at III.
60 E.g., The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. & Hazardous Materials, 105th Cong. 1 (1998) [hereinafter
1998 House Finance Hearing] (statement of Rep. Michael G. Oxley, Chairman, Subcomm.
on Fin. & Hazardous Materials); id. at 4 (statement of Rep. Tom Bliley, Chairman, H.
Comm. on Commerce).
61 Id. at 11 (statement of Paul V. Gerlach, Associate Director, Division of
Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission).
62 Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of
1998, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2011 (Nov. 10, 1998).63 Id.
64 S. REP. No. 105-19, at 45 (1998) (statement of Hon. Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under
Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs).
65 1998 House Finance Hearing, supra note 60, at 6 (statement of Andrew J. Pincus,
General Counsel, Department of Commerce).
66See Press Release, Dow Jones, Dow Jones Survey: Confusion About Anti-
Corruption Laws Leads Companies to Abandon Expansion Initiatives (Dec. 9, 2009),
available at http://fis.dowjones.com/risk/09survey.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y9TS-
R2X3.
67 Mike Koehler, Survey Says..., FCPA PROFESSOR (June 2, 2011, 5:25 AM),
http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/06/survey-says.html, archived at http://perma.cc
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This capital withdrawal, and other countries' exploitation of it, reappeared
in more recent congressional testimony. During the June 2011 hearing on
amending the FCPA, attorney George Terwilliger noted that while we are
realizing the goal of heightened compliance with anti-bribery provisions:
[T]here is another less desirable effect. . . when companies forgo business
opportunity out of concern for FCPA compliance risk. This hurts the creation
of [U.S.] jobs and the ability of U.S. companies to compete with companies
elsewhere that do not have to concern themselves with uncertainties of the
terms and requirements of the FCPA.... [T]here is hidden cost borne of the
uncertainties attached to FCPA compliance risk.... [C]ompanies sometimes
forgo deals they could otherwise do, take a pass on contemplated projects, or
withdraw from ongoing projects and ventures.68
The label we generally attach to the government-induced withdrawal of
capital from developing countries in protest of their political conditions is
economic sanctions. The broader project, of which this Article is a part,
analyzes the "sanctioning effect" of anti-bribery law.69 Economic sanctions
literature teaches that when some part of the world sanctions a given country, a
capital void is created. Because the sanctioned country still needs that capital
(i.e., FDI) to stimulate its economic growth, it will look to countries not
participating in the sanctions to fill the void. These latter countries are
sometimes called "black knights"-they rescue the sanctioned country, but
through nefarious means. 70
Anti-corruption law is today creating a similar sanctioning effect, as the
empirical evidence above concerning "ownership substitution" and the survey
data demonstrate. The principal black knight in the anti-bribery space is
China-a country with ample capital, an aggressive foreign and economic
policy, and a near-complete absence of extraterritorial anti-corruption
enforcement.71 When companies subject to U.S. jurisdiction find the risk of a
bribery violation too high, and they withdraw from a project, or a sector, or a
country, the resulting FDI void is frequently filled by Chinese or other "black
knight" companies who are not subject to extraterritorial anti-bribery
enforcement.
But what effect does this dynamic have on our deterrence goals? What is
the net impact on the overall rates of bribery, for example, in the host country?
/V89T-U82Q (quoting KPMG, GLOBAL ANTI-BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION SURVEY 2011, at
18(2011)).68 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 37 (2011)
(statement of George J. Terwilliger, III, Partner, White & Case LLP).69 See Spalding, The Irony, supra note 12, at 402-03; Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions,
supra note 12, at 372-73. Portions of Parts L.A and I.B have been adapted from material
that previously appeared in one or more of those Articles.70 See Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions, supra note 12, at 397.
71 See Spalding, The Irony, supra note 12, at 360-61.
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The empirical evidence does not address this question. The next section builds
a model to do so.
III. DETERRENCE DETERIORATES
This section illustrates how extraterritorial deterrence will ultimately fail
to deliver on its promise of efficiently protecting prospective victims from
crime. Using empirical evidence, it builds a quantitative model to demonstrate
the impact of anti-bribery enforcement on overall levels of bribery in a host
country. Our deterrence efforts ultimately prove to be neither effective nor
efficient: we cannot reduce crime, and may even increase crime; and we
cannot justify this, or any other result, to those taxpayers who seek utility
maximization through cost efficiency.
Though scholars up to now have not seemed particularly concerned about
the collateral economic harm of deterring criminal behavior, contemporary
international white-collar enforcement presents new challenges to the logic of
deterrence. Despite deterrence's relatively long history, originating in the
eighteenth-century works of Montesquieu, 72 Beccaria, 73 and Bentham,
74 the
concept fell out of fashion and was largely neglected7 5 until the seminal work
of Gary Becker in the 1960s.76 And owing largely to Cold War ideological
divisions, international business-and particularly the flow of capital from
developed to developing countries-would not increase significantly until
after the collapse of communism in the early 1990s. As will be shown below,
this new economic order raises significant theoretical and practical problems
for deterrence.
Extraterritorial conduct of any sort already raises formidable law
enforcement challenges: evidence is difficult to collect, foreign enforcement
authorities may not be cooperative or well resourced, and cultural sensitivities
must be navigated. But this Article argues that the challenges of extraterritorial
white-collar deterrence run far deeper. By definition, many or most actors
committing crimes in foreign jurisdictions are not subject to the same set of
disincentives: companies seeking to extract Nigeria's oil will hail from the
United States, the European Union, Russia, China, and elsewhere, and these
countries will have substantially different white-collar crime regimes in place.
The United States, for example, may be able to deter socially destructive
behavior among U.S. companies and other companies subject to U.S.
jurisdiction, but it cannot readily alter the behavior of those companies that lie
72 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 161-62 (David Wallace Carrithers ed.,
Thomas Nugent trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1977) (1748).
73 BECCARIA, supra note 16.
74 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 170-71 (1965).
75 See Paternoster, supra note 5, at 773.
76 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169, 170 (1968).
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beyond its jurisdiction. To the extent that a country wishes to reduce criminal
conduct in overseas locations where only a portion of all actors is subject to its
jurisdiction, this becomes problematic.
Of course, it may well be true that in certain areas of law the aim is not to
reduce the overall levels of a given sort of extraterritorial crime. We may wish
only to deter the conduct among our own citizens, perhaps untroubled by the
impact our own deterrence efforts may have on overall levels of criminality in
those foreign locations. But other areas of law, such as anti-bribery law,
prohibit the overseas conduct categorically, without regard to whether the
conduct has any harmful impact whatsoever on U.S. markets or persons. This
section shows just how problematic that goal will prove to be. It develops a
model 77 that illustrates how, given current and foreseeable future legal and
economic conditions, extraterritorial deterrence has pronounced crimogenic7 8
tendencies. That is, in attempting to reduce crime overseas, wielding the tools
of deterrence will often create the conditions in which the conduct we seek to
deter actually proliferates.
In building the model, this Article will not speculate on how a perfectly
rational government might enforce a bribery prohibition. Rather, it seeks to
understand how actual governments, subject to constraints in their knowledge
and other resources, do enforce such laws. Part III.A explains the various
assumptions that are necessary if the subsequent model is to mimic reality to
any meaningful degree. Part III.B then builds that model, and Part III.C draws
out the implications that pose particular problems for utilitarianism.
A. Subrational Governments in Inefficient Markets
FDI, particularly in developing countries, has three inherent characteristics
that distinguish it from the domestic conduct that deterrence scholarship
generally assumes. In combination, they create a kind of perfect storm in
which deterrence will often prove self-defeating.
The first I will call selective criminalization. A given form of
extraterritorial conduct may well be criminalized by a particular home
jurisdiction: think of express statutory prohibitions on overseas bribery or
monopolistic conduct in the United States, and the dedication of substantial
resources to their enforcement. But other countries may fall into either of two
alternative categories: those that do not enforce their prohibitions, and those
77 This model was first presented in a Chapman University School of Law
Symposium entitled, What Can Law and Economics Teach Us About Corporate Social
Responsibility? An earlier version of this model has been published. See generally Andrew
Spalding, The Problem ofDeterring Extraterritorial White-Collar Crime, 17 CHAP. L. REv
355 (2014).
7 For discussion of crimogenics in deterrence, see Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst
When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 985 (2003); see also KENNEDY, supra note 29, at
54-72.
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that have not enacted such prohibitions. In other words, among all actors in a
given foreign jurisdiction, the conduct is only selectively criminalized: the
criminal prohibition applies to some of the companies pursuing Nigerian oil,
but not to others. The United States may wish to deter bribery there, but lacks
jurisdiction over many of the actors.
The second characteristic I will call the discretionary investment forum. A
typical U.S.-based company will be doing business in the United States. The
enforcement authority thus need not worry whether that company will choose
to continue doing business there (unless, of course, a given criminal
prohibition threatens to drive a company out of business altogether, but this is
rare and probably confined to highly dubious business models). But overseas
investment forums are inherently discretionary: a U.S.-based company may
choose to focus its efforts in the United States, or to enter overseas markets,
and if the latter, whether to focus on the developed or developing world, and
whether to invest in particular countries. These countries will vary in their
legal, economic, and cultural environments, potentially creating varying levels
of risk that a U.S.-based company will engage in conduct that its home
jurisdiction criminalizes. Accordingly, the enforcement authority must
consider whether its companies will do business in these jurisdictions at all.
When the enforcement authority uses the tools of deterrence to raise the costs
of particular behavior, the costs may rise to the level that, in certain contexts,
the risk becomes too great. Companies may then use their discretion to not
invest in particular projects, sectors, or countries. The effort to deter crime has
thus deterred investment.
Should the enforcement authority care? The question goes to the very
heart of the law and economics methodology. Richard Posner has
characterized law as "a system for maximizing the wealth of society."
79 The
aim of enforcement is thus to increase wealth, for individual persons and for
society generally. The deterrence of investment in foreign countries has
implications for both. Companies may forego relatively efficient investment
opportunities for safer, but less efficient (and profitable) opportunities. This, in
turn, impacts the wealth of both the capital-exporting and the capital-importing
nation: the exporter's GDP is negatively impacted by the diminished profits of
its companies; and the importer's GDP is negatively impacted by the loss of
foreign direct investment. If deterrence is understood as one of many
mechanisms for increasing social wealth, deterring investment in particular
discretionary investment forums is problematic. This becomes especially true
in developing countries where the need to maximize wealth is most pressing.
The third characteristic I will call investor substitution, and it is alluded to
in the empirical studies mentioned above. Assume, for purposes of this theory,
that the companies from diverse jurisdictions are interchangeable-that
companies from the United States, Germany, and China are equally capable of
providing the given good or service. This is of course not true in all industries;
79 POSNER, supra note 22, § 2.2.
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highly technologically sophisticated sectors, for example, will tend to favor
companies from more developed countries. But the gap is narrowing as
developing countries like China progress, and the gap does not exist at all for
many or most industries. Further assume that the host country's need for FDI
is constant, such that if companies originating from one jurisdiction are
disinclined to do business in the manner expected by the host country, that
host country will seek the investment from other jurisdictions. Given these
assumptions, quasi-criminalization and the discretionary investment forum
will result in investor substitution. Companies from a country that enforces a
given criminal prohibition-again, think of the United States enforcing a
bribery prohibition-may find the risk (say, of paying bribes in Nigeria) too
high. Those companies may choose not to invest in countries like Nigeria (as
ample empirical evidence demonstrates).80 The host country, which remains in
need of the FDI, will seek it from companies that are from jurisdictions that do
not enforce the prohibition. Because these companies can provide roughly the
same good or service-in other words, the substitution costs to the host
country are negligible-they will become substitute foreign investors.
This analysis is related to, but significantly different from, the previous
work on substitution. That body of scholarship, as noted above, has focused on
a given actor substituting criminal acts Y and Z for criminal act X. It assumed
a given set of actors, choosing among alternative forms of criminality. The
principle of investor substitution is quite different. It assumes alternative
actors all deciding whether to engage in the same form of criminality (or, to be
clear, conduct that one jurisdiction deems criminal, though others do not). It is
a variation on the substitution thesis that applies uniquely to the realm of
extraterritorial enforcement.
While these conditions characterize the business environment that
governments try to regulate, a second set of conditions will describe how
governments might go about that regulation. This Article does not assume the
existence of a perfectly rational enforcement authority. Rather than exploring
what a hypothetical authority should do, it explores the implications of what
actual governments would do or have done. It posits a number of conditions
that closely resemble the actual world of anti-bribery enforcement, conditions
which would likely be typical of other areas of extraterritorial white-collar
criminal enforcement as well. Such an enforcement authority is, predictably,
economically subrational in several important respects.
First, the enforcement authority assumes that the optimal level of bribery
is zero, and does not engage in sophisticated arguments about whether some
amount of bribery may actually be efficient. This assumption holds true both
for bribery among companies subject to its jurisdiction and for overall levels
of bribery in the host countries as well. Alternatively, one might assume that
the enforcement authority is guided by a deontological argument-that bribery
0 For a summary of the empirical literature, see Spalding, Corruption, supra note 12,
at 1375-79.
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is inherently wrong-rather than an assumption about the relationship between
bribery and economic efficiency. Either way, the authority is determined to
reduce bribery as far as possible.
Second, and relatedly, the agencies of the enforcement authority that
enforce the bribery prohibition will actually take measures to deter bribery
without regard for their impact on economic efficiency. Whatever they may
have assumed about the relationship between bribery and efficiency, the
statute charges the agencies with reducing bribery and makes no mention of its
economic implications.
Third, the enforcement authority is unwilling or unable to impose a
combination of enforcement expenditures and level of penalty that would
immediately reduce bribery to zero. It is faced with limited enforcement
resources, uncertain political support, and imperfect empirical knowledge
about the effects of enforcement on crime. Similarly, it likely subscribes to
notions of fairness that will prevent it from imposing the exorbitant penalties
that could deter bribery where the probability of detection was more limited.
Thus constrained, the enforcement authority experiments with varying levels
of enforcement over time (which is precisely what has occurred in the United
States).81 Accordingly, the illustration below posits a recognizably subrational
enforcement authority, and uses law and economics principles to trace out the
implications of that authority's enforcement decisions.
B. Crimogenics Exposed
Assume, then, a developing country (the host country) that solicits foreign
direct investment in its infrastructure sector. In this country and sector, bribery
is quite common. Further assume that companies from two jurisdictions-
Jurisdiction A and Jurisdiction B-have historically invested in this sector.
82
All firms competing in the host country's infrastructure sector are from one of
these jurisdictions; no companies from jurisdictions other than A or B are
investing there.
The host country will regularly issue requests for proposals (RFPs) and
companies will submit bids in an effort to win contracts. Each contract
involves a variety of transactions in which bribes would typically be paid:
some would be paid during the bidding process (preparing and submitting the
bid, then winning the contract) and others would be paid in the course of
performing the contract (visas, permits, inspections, etc.). Further assume that
the number of transactions per contract is fixed, resulting in a fixed number of
81 See id. at 1371-75.
821 use "jurisdiction" rather than "country" because often the jurisdiction of a given
country will extend to companies from other countries as well-for example, certain
foreign companies are subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. extraterritorial anti-bribery
statute, such that even though they do not reside in the United States, they are nevertheless
"from" the U.S. jurisdiction.
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total transactions. For purposes of this argument, assume that 100% of all
business transactions in the host country's government have involved bribes.
At a time that we shall call Time 1, neither Jurisdiction A nor Jurisdiction
B is enforcing an extraterritorial bribery prohibition. Firms from both A and B
therefore pay bribes freely. But Jurisdiction A firms are more efficient than
Jurisdiction B firms, such that A firms in Time 1 win 60% of the contracts and
B firms win 40%. The chart below captures these numbers.
Table 1
% Market % Bribes That Overall Rate
Time Enforcement Share for A Firms Pay of Bribery in
Level Firms from in Their Host
Jurisdiction A Transactions Country
TI None 60 100 100
Firms from Jurisdiction A win 60% of the contracts, but pay bribes in
100% of the transactions. Jurisdiction B firms thus have a 40% market share,
and likewise bribe 100% of the time. The overall rate of bribery in the
infrastructure sector of the host country is therefore 100% in Time 1.
However, at Time 2, Jurisdiction A announces that it will begin enforcing
an extraterritorial criminal bribery prohibition. The enforcement agencies are,
again, subrational actors, so they are unable to implement an enforcement
regime that would reduce bribery to zero: they cannot dedicate the resources
necessary to raise the probability of detection to the requisite level, and
fairness principles do not allow them to impose exorbitant penalties that would
compensate for the low level of detection. Constrained as they are by limited
resources and by fairness, they commence what we will call a low level of
enforcement. Jurisdiction B does not follow suit and does not implement any
kind of extraterritorial bribery prohibition, so B firms continue to bribe freely.
The host country issues a new set of RFPs and awards all available
contracts to firms from Jurisdictions A and B. A firms now become what we
will call reluctant bribe payers. They do not stop paying bribes altogether, but
they begin searching for ways to avoid paying bribes where possible while
remaining present in the sector and profitable. While they may have previously
paid a small bribe to expedite a visa approval, they are now willing to wait;
instead of paying a bribe to send their goods immediately through customs,
their ships wait in line for days in the harbor. Similarly, the government of
Jurisdiction A begins working on behalf of its companies to reduce the
demand for bribery in the host country (as the U.S. and U.K. governments do
today).
The reluctant bribe payers (companies from Jurisdiction A) recognize that
avoiding bribes will often reduce their efficiency-waiting in the harbor for
customs approval is not without cost to the company. But they are willing to
absorb these costs to reduce the risk of penalty for violating the prohibition.
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Although the risk of penalty is high enough to deter a certain amount of
bribery, it is not high enough to completely stop paying bribes. For reluctant
bribe payers, the benefits of continuing to invest in the host country remain
high enough that the company can pay some bribes and accept the risk that it
will be caught and penalized for violating the bribery prohibition.
In the course of continuing to do business in the host country, the reluctant
bribe payer will therefore encounter three kinds of transactions. The first is
where the risk of detection is sufficiently high (or the firm is sufficiently
principled) that it refuses to pay the bribe but can still find ways to complete
the transaction. These may entail increased costs for the firm (such as waiting
in line at port) but owing to the firm's efficiency (or the less than perfectly
competitive market conditions) the firm can absorb these costs while
remaining profitable. Alternatively, the firm may seek the diplomatic
assistance of the governments (in the United States, these would be the
Departments of Commerce or State). This is the kind of conduct that anti-
bribery advocates seek to incentivize and may generally assume occurs.
However, the firm will encounter a second kind of bribe, in which it will
likewise refuse to pay but cannot complete the transaction without it. The firm
must therefore knowingly forego the transaction; the best example would be a
lost bid in a RFP. For the third kind of bribe, the risk of detection may be
sufficiently low, or the costs of foregoing the transaction are sufficiently high
(the company really needs this particular bid, or cannot afford to wait three
days in port) that the firm will pay the bribe and accept the risk of detection.83
Given the three types of bribes the firm will encounter and Jurisdiction
A's new but still-low level of enforcement, assume that A firms reduce their
bribery by half. They are now willing pay bribes in 50% of all transactions.
Assume further that as a result, the percentage of contracts they will be able to
win also drops by half, from 60% of all contracts to 30% of all contracts.
Investor substitution occurs, and B firms win the extra 30% of the contracts.
Now A firms have 30% of the market and B firms have 70%. Owing to the
downside of deterrence's upside, B firms continue to bribe in 100% of all their
transactions, and therefore will bribe on the extra 30% of the contracts they
will win. But because A firms were paying bribes on those contracts in Time
1, investor substitution has not resulted in a net increase in bribery in the host
country.
83 The ability of companies from Jurisdiction A to absorb a degree of lost profits but
remain competitive assumes that the market is not what economists would consider
perfectly competitive. If it was, the companies would have no margin to absorb the losses
because competitors would have already been selling at the lower cost. But foreign direct
investment is not perfectly competitive, in at least two respects. First, often a sort of
oligopoly exists where only select companies from select countries are positioned to
compete. Second, some companies might have a competitive advantage by virtue of their
access to capital, technological, or various forms of government support. Accordingly, this
illustration assumes that Jurisdiction A firms are operating at a level of profitability that
permits them to absorb limited losses to comply with the statute.
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Rather, A's low level of enforcement has thus succeeded in two respects.
Of the 30% of the contracts that A firms win, they will only pay bribes in 50%
of these transactions. For half of this 30%, or 15%, no bribes are being paid;
this portion of the host country's infrastructure sector is now clean. A's
enforcement has thus reduced bribery among its own firms by 50%, and has
reduced net bribery levels in the host country by 15%.
Table 2
% Market % Bribes Overall Rate
. Enforcement Share for That A Firms of Bribery
Level Firms from Pay in Their in Host
Jurisdiction A Transactions Country
TI None 60 100 100
T2 Low 30 50 85
Again, overall levels of bribery have gone down from 100% to 85%
because A firms have a 30% market share and are not paying bribes on half of
the related transactions. This is the outcome that anti-bribery advocates take
for granted, and for those who accept the normative premise that federal law
should deter overseas bribery, it is the reason to continue enforcement.
But now assume a subsequent point in time, called Time 3. The
enforcement authorities in Jurisdiction A, perhaps encouraged from the
successes of Time 2, have decided to ramp up enforcement through the
dedication of new resources. We will call this mid-level enforcement, and it
significantly increases the likelihood of detecting violations. In Time 3, the
host country issues a new set of RFPs. The other assumptions still hold: the
total number of transactions is again fixed, companies from Jurisdictions A
and B will again compete, and companies from Jurisdiction B still bribe
without fear of punishment.
Companies from Jurisdiction A now engage in a new cost-benefit analysis.
They conclude that because the risk of detection and therefore penalty is
higher, they must pay even fewer bribes than they did in Time 2. Say that mid-
level enforcement induces A firms to reduce their bribery percentage from
50% to 25% of all transactions.
The mid-level enforcement regime has thus succeeded in reducing bribery
among companies subject to its jurisdiction. But consider the impact that
investor substitution will now have on the change in overall bribery levels
from Time 2 to Time 3. Although A firms won 60% of all contracts when
bribing 100% of the time, they can now win only 1/4 of those contracts.84
84 This exercise assumes that the percentage of contracts it can win will drop in
precisely the same amount as the percentage of bribes it can pay. In practice, the
relationship between these two figures would be more complex.
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They now have only a 15% market share, down from 30% in Time 2. The 15%
market share that A firms have lost since Time 2 will now go to B firms,
which continue to bribe 100% of the time. In other words, 15% of the
transactions have shifted from reluctant bribe payers to free bribe payers. A
firms remain engaged in only 15% of all transactions in the host country's
infrastructure sector, and they will pay bribes in 1/4 of that 15%. Accordingly,
A firms are bribe-free in 11% of all transactions. Because all other transactions
are paid with bribes, the overall bribery level in the host country is now at
89%.
Table 3
% Market % Bribes That Overall Rate
Time Enforcement Share for A Firms Pay of Bribery in
Level Firms from in Their
Jurisdiction A Transactions
Tl None 60 100 100
T2 Low 30 50 85
T3 Mid 15 25 89
From Time 2, overall bribery has increased by 4%. And that increase is
entirely due to Jurisdiction A's increased enforcement effort.
Consider a further period in time, Time 4, in which Jurisdiction A has
finally resolved to dedicate the enforcement resources necessary to achieve
what it deems the optimal rate of bribery among its firms-0%. And suppose it
succeeds, such that now A firms pay absolutely no bribes. Further assume that
all other conditions remain the same, and the host country issues a new set of
RFPs. Jurisdiction A firms can no longer win contracts in this host country's
infrastructure sector. B firms now win 100% of the contracts, engage in 100%
of the transactions, and pay bribes 100% of the time. While the rate of bribery
among A firms is now 0%, the overall rate of bribery in the host country is
100%.
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Table 4
% Market % Bribes That Overall Rate
. Enforcement Share for A Firms Pay of Bribery in
Level Firms from in Their Host
Jurisdiction A Transactions Country
TI None 60 100 100
T2 Low 30 50 85
T3 Mid 15 25 89
T4 High 0 0 100
Notice the pattern. At Time 2, its efforts to deter bribery were effective in
reducing the overall level of bribery in the host country. Companies from
Jurisdiction A indeed lost business as a result of the decision to enforce the
bribery prohibition. But in Time 1, companies from Jurisdiction A were
bribing as freely as companies from Jurisdiction B, so losing business to
companies from Jurisdiction B at Time 2 did not result in an increase in
bribery for the host country. Then at Time 3, the second increase in
enforcement has reduced bribery only among companies subject to A's
jurisdiction. Those companies are indeed bribing less, but owing to investor
substitution, the impact on overall levels of bribery in the host country is a net
increase. And we saw at Time 4 that raising penalty risks further can produce a
scenario in which the rates of bribery in the host country return to 100%, a
level not seen since before the enforcement effort began.
In sum, after Time 1, the overall rate of bribery in the host country
correlates inversely with Jurisdiction A's enforcement. Likewise, it correlates
inversely with the percentage of bribes that A firms are paying. As Jurisdiction
A attempts, and succeeds, in decreasing bribery among its own companies, it
increases overall bribery in the developing country.
This illustration is of course artificially simplified. In reality, a number of
additional variables would influence the net impact of increased enforcement:
the number of transactions, the number of agencies or persons soliciting
bribes, changes in the level of penalty, changes in the effectiveness of the
reluctant bribe payer's tools for avoiding bribes, and perhaps most
importantly, a decrease in the percentage of transactions in developing
countries that require bribes. Expanding this model to include each of these
variables is a project for another day. But this thought experiment nevertheless
illustrates limitations inherent in the effort to deter extraterritorial white-collar
crime, given current global economic and legal conditions. And it raises two
distinct utilitarian problems.
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C. Am I My Brother's Utility Maximizer?
Though the enforcement authority's aim is to maximize utility,
extraterritorial white-collar deterrence will tend to produce two distinct forms
of disutility.
The first is, quite simply, that it often will not work. As explained above,
overseas business environments will often produce an increase, rather than a
decrease, in the conduct we seek to deter. This will be true as long as capital-
exporting jurisdictions vary in their enactment and enforcement of criminal
prohibitions. The answer, one might think, is to tinker with the variables
available to the enforcement authority: enforcement expenditures, fine levels,
the length of imprisonment, and the standard for imposing liability. The
problem, however, is that once into Time 2, decreasing the cost of the penalty
through any of these four variables will necessarily decrease the disincentive
to engage in the act: reducing enforcement expenditures, fines, or prison terms,
or raising the standard for imposing liability, will decrease the costs of crime
and increase its frequency.
In Times 2 and 3, the enforcement authority is trapped. By not increasing
the risk of detection, it tolerates a measure of criminality among persons
subject to its jurisdiction. But by raising the risk of detection, it produces the
concurrent decrease in criminality among its companies, and an increase in
that same behavior in the host country among all actors. These are the Scylla
and Charybdis of extraterritorial white-collar criminal enforcement. The
enforcement authority must choose between the harm of knowingly tolerating
preventable criminality among its own companies, and knowingly increasing
levels of criminality in vulnerable developing countries. It cannot avoid both.
The enforcement authority thus seeks the golden mean or, if one prefers,
the Goldilocks theory, of enforcement: to enforce its prohibition only to the
point that it deters overall levels of bribery, and not further. The law and
economics enforcement authority is trapped in this dilemma, unable to achieve
what it considers the optimal level of criminality among its own actors without
raising levels of the same conduct in the host country.
But even if the first problem were resolved, and overseas deterrence
efforts were to effectively reduce crime, the law and economics enforcement
authority would be left with a second problem. Consider again the assumption
behind the economic theory of public enforcement: the taxpayer is the
potential victim, and she pays taxes to prevent her victimization. That works in
domestic enforcement, where all potential victims are taxpayers and all
taxpayers are potential victims. But what if the victims are not taxpayers, and
the taxpayers are not victims? What if the victims lie beyond the jurisdiction
that is enforcing the criminal prohibition, and are therefore not paying the
taxes that fund enforcement? Put another way, am I my brother's utility
maximizer?
Again using the anti-bribery example, we devote substantial public
resources to protecting those overseas victims through the DOJ, SEC, FBI,
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offices in Commerce and State, and the federal judiciary.85 And various
economic benefits might very well accrue to U.S. taxpayers, including the
improvement of overseas markets and the resulting potential for economic and
political alliances. But stakeholders to anti-bribery enforcement generally
agree that the principal victims of extraterritorial bribery are the citizens of the
overseas governments. And they're not paying for enforcement. That is,
Congress enacted a statute in which U.S. taxpayers would pay to protect non-
taxpayers from the harms of bribery. To the utility-maximizing taxpayer
typically associated with law and economics, this is the second disutility of
deterrence. It is inescapable, and reflects the limitations of the deterrence
paradigm in explaining not just how to deter overseas criminality, but why we
should even try.
To the extent that the extraterritorial statute is designed both to deter
criminality among the jurisdiction's own actors and to reduce overall levels of
crime, the traditional mechanisms of deterrence may not be the most effective
tools available. That is, the means typically employed by deterrence advocates
may not be best suited to achieve deterrence's goals. Rather, the achievement
of deterrence goals may require using non-deterrence, or extra-deterrence,
means.
As the above illustration shows, extraterritorial crime reduction requires
reaching two sets of actors who lie beyond the reach of the enforcement
authority. The first is the host country: to the extent that a capital-importing
country can enforce its own prohibitions (on bribery, for instance) no investor
substitution can occur. All companies investing in that country would (in
theory) be subject to the same risks and costs, and would engage in crime at
roughly similar levels. If the host country sought to reduce a given form of
conduct to zero, it could do so, and differences among the capital-exporting
jurisdictions would become irrelevant. But a developing country, almost by
definition, is ill-equipped to do so; its state is not yet sufficiently resourced to
deter the conduct of powerful foreign firms. This is thus a long-term project.
Accordingly, the capital-exporting jurisdiction seeking to deter destructive
conduct in foreign countries can also seek to influence the behavior of
competing capital-exporting jurisdictions that do not enforce comparable
prohibitions (the B Jurisdictions). The problem, of course, is that the enforcing
jurisdictions (the A Jurisdictions) generally have no authority over either the
capital-importing or capital-exporting governments.
But notice the relatively modest-and therefore perhaps not intractable-
problem. At Time 3, when the overall rates of bribery in this model increased
for the first time, the difference was relatively slight: a mere 4%. At Time 4,
when the enforcing jurisdiction resolved to achieve the optimal level of
85 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO
THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4-7 (2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE],
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf, archived at
http://perma.ccN86D-N7QQ.
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bribery among its companies (namely, none) the overall level increased by
another 11%.
These numbers are not staggering. But when the policy aim is crime
reduction in the host country, any crime increase that results directly from our
enforcement efforts merits some attention. Admittedly, criminal enforcement
would unleash other forces that would chip away at this increase, particularly
where the enforcement actions are publicized. Civil society can agitate for
reforms. Other states can wield the levers of international diplomacy.
International organizations can pressure non-enforcing jurisdictions through
review mechanisms. These forces are significant, and this analysis does not
mean to dismiss them. But acknowledging a perverse enforcement outcome,
and merely hoping that other entities or policy initiatives will reverse it, is
hardly satisfactory. This Article aims to identify an approach to criminal
enforcement that would itself achieve the stated aim of reducing crime. The
next section does so.
IV. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR CORPORATIONS AND THEIR VICTIMS
As the above model illustrates, the deterrence approach suffers from two
distinct but closely related limitations that in combination prove fatal. First, it
cannot reach competitor firms from jurisdictions that do not enforce the
extraterritorial prohibition. Extraterritorial deterrence fails because not all
potential violators are subject to the enforcing country's jurisdiction. But this
is not the only way to approach crime reduction in a foreign jurisdiction. The
other would be to adopt host-country reforms that could reduce the
environmental inducements (such as bribe solicitation or extortion) that give
rise to crime. We might use criminal enforcement to identify the causes of
crime and to identify or fund initiatives to address those causes. But the law-
and-economics approach to deterrence undertakes no such thing; it does not
even try to reach the host country governments. It merely punishes the
wrongdoer, with the aim of specifically deterring the wrongdoer's recidivism
and generally deterring others through fear of punishment.
The solution, then, lies in an alternative theory of criminal punishment that
aspires to more than specific and general deterrence. Absent an extraordinarily
broad theory of jurisdiction for extraterritorial crime no theory of punishment
can extend deterrence's sphere influence to reach foreign competitors. What
extraterritorial criminal enforcement needs, then, is a foundational theory of
punishment that looks beyond the potential violators within its jurisdiction and
engages with the broader social and legal environment in which the crime
occurred. Criminal theory provides three basic possibilities: deterrence,
retribution, and rehabilitation/restoration. 86
The above critique of extraterritorial enforcement will typically first evoke
a retributivist response: we punish these corporate criminals to ensure that they
8 6 MIETHE & LU, supra note 21, at 15.
3832015]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
get what they deserve, not because of some kind of cost-benefit analysis on
social impact.87 By this argument U.S. law does not and should not aim to
actually reduce crime in overseas countries; we enforce to express our
disapproval of the criminal act, and the collateral consequences are quite
beside the point.
Applied to extraterritorial white-collar enforcement, the retributivist
position is completely coherent. And absent a contrary policy commitment,
retribution would provide a sufficient justification for extraterritorial
enforcement efforts. But this Article is based on the premise that in certain
areas of law-anti-bribery being the best example-our statutes are in fact
based on the expectation that our enforcement efforts would reduce crime in
the countries in which we do business.
What is needed, then, is a theory of criminal justice that seeks to reduce
crime but looks beyond the potential offender's cost-benefit analysis. That
theory is restorative justice. Though typically associated with traditional
crimes committed by natural persons, Part IV will argue that restorative justice
can, and should, apply to extraterritorial corporate crime. Part IV.A will
describe the restorative justice approach and show that it is now in practice in
federal white-collar environmental enforcement in the form of supplemental
sentences. Part IV.B will explain how the U.S. Constitution provides the
contours of this sentencing practice: a constitutional tension between the
executive and legislative functions ultimately produced a series of guidelines
for supplemental sentences that are readily transferable to extraterritorial
white-collar enforcement. Part IV.C will then show that supplemental
sentences are likewise already authorized, and indeed encouraged, under
existing federal sentencing law. Finally, Part IV.D will describe the
unexpectedly simple solution to the problem that this Article has taken such
pains to describe: the transference of existing domestic white-collar
enforcement procedures to extraterritorial enforcement.
A. The Corporate Criminal as Social Healer
A body of scholarship has long argued for moving away from the
traditional adversarial model of legal practice and toward an understanding of
the lawyer as a "peacemaker." By this account, the lawyer's aim in practice is
to prevent future conflict by understanding and improving social interactions
between offender, victim, and community.88 Lawyering is thus recast as a
"healing profession," taking a "restorative" approach to the practice of law.89
87 1d. at 16; see PHILIP BEAN, PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL
INQUIRY 13 (1981); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 25, 30 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972).
88 Forrest S. Mosten, Lawyer as Peacemaker: Building a Successful Law Practice
Without Ever Going to Court, 43 FAM. L.Q. 489, 489 (2009).
89 Susan Daicoff, Law as a Healing Profession: The "Comprehensive Law
Movement, " 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 1 (2006).
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Suffice it to say that this literature is not typically associated with
multinational corporate practice. But might it be? Can multinational
corporations, who have committed crimes, heal social wounds? Can corporate
defense counsel, and federal prosecutors, be peacemakers? This section posits
that the answer is yes. But it is not a mere potentiality. I argue that this is
already happening, in federal white-collar criminal enforcement, and that those
practices can extend-indeed, should extend-to extraterritorial white-collar
crimes.
Restorative justice (RJ) emerged in the 1970s in response to widespread
perceptions that the criminal justice system "neither effectively deterred crime
nor successfully rehabilitated offenders." 90 RJ differs from deterrence in
focusing on more than just the defendant and its cost-benefit analysis. Rather
than deterrence's exclusive focus on the defendant, RJ focuses on three
distinct "stakeholders" to crime: the victim(s), the offender(s), and the affected
communities.9 1 It involves all three stakeholders in the sentencing, and is
based on the fundamental principle that criminal behavior not only violates the
law, but "also injures victims and the community." 92 Core assumptions of RJ
include: the response to crime should repair the harm to the victim as much as
possible; offenders should recognize the impact of the harm on the victim and
the community; victims should have an opportunity to express their needs and
participate in the determining the best way to make reparation; and the
community has a responsibility to contribute to this process. 93 It aims not just
to punish and prevent crime, but to actually restore the relationship between
the offender, the victim, and the social environment. The victim is restored, the
offender recognizes his wrong, and the fear of crime is diminished for the
community.94
Accordingly, where deterrence is one-dimensional in its focus on the
offender, RJ is three-dimensional: in addition to the offender, it focuses on the
victim as well as the social environment that gave rise to the offense. RJ has
been defined as a form of punishment that is primarily oriented towards doing
justice by restoring the harm that has been caused by a crime.95 It focuses on
repairing or compensating the victim, in order to restore the public's
confidence that the crime has been condemned, disapproving of the norm
90 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work?, 3 ANN.
REV. L. & Soc. ScI. 161, 163 (2007).
91 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 7, at 11.9 2 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 7, at 6.
93 Id. at 8.
94 Andrew von Hirsch et al., Specifying Aims and Limits for Restorative Justice: A
'Making Amends' Model?, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING
OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS? 21, 22 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 2003).
9 5 See Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave, Restorative Juvenile Justice: In Search of
Fundamentals and an Outline for Systemic Reform, in RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE:
REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 45, 48 (Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave eds.,
1999).
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transgression, and reassurance of the norm and norm enforcement to the
public, victims, and offenders. 96 This focus on the victim might be called the
second dimension of punishment.
But RJ is not merely a set of outcomes; so too is it a process by which the
victim, offender, and affected community members "participate ... actively in
the resolution of matters arising from the crime." 97 This involvement of the
community introduces the third dimension. Indeed, another scholar has
defined RJ as "a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular
offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of
the offence and its implications for the future." 98 Through the process, both the
victim and the offender come to understand the factors that gave rise to the
damaging behavior.99 "Others who had a role to play in the offence or the
circumstances that led to it are also encouraged to assume responsibility for
their part. . . ."1oo The process "encourages frank discussion of the
background of the offence in a spirit of explanation rather than making
excuses."101 Ultimately, the sentencing process should be helpful in
"identifying underlying causes of crime and developing crime prevention
strategies." 102
However, in focusing on the victim and the community, RJ need not call
attention away from, or otherwise "go light" on, the offender. Much
scholarship has addressed the question of whether punishment of the offender
is indeed consistent with restorative goals. Early RJ thought was characterized
by a dichotomy. Advocates of RJ argued that in seeking restoration we must
eschew retribution and punishment, while advocates of punishment argued
punishment must always be the primary aim of the state's response to crime,
and that restoration must be a secondary goal that can be pursued only insofar
as it does not compromise retribution's core values of justice, proportionality,
and fairness.1 03 But others have demonstrated this dichotomy to be false: that
retribution remains an important component of RJ, and that full restoration
actually requires retribution and punishment.1 04 Indeed, insofar as restoration
still aims to give victims and community members reassurance both that
justice has been served, and that future harms have been prevented,
96 See Lode Walgrave, Imposing Restoration Instead of Inflicting Pain: Reflections on
the Judicial Reaction to Crime, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS?, supra note 94, at 61, 65.
97 E.S.C. Res. 2002/12, U.N. Doc. E/2000/INF/2/Add.2, at 1.2 (July 24, 2002).
9 8 BRAITHWAITE, supra note 7, at 11.
9 9 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 7, at 9.
100Id. at 11.
101Id
102Id. at 10.
10 3 Antony Duff, Restoration and Retribution, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS?, supra note 94, at 43, 43.
104 Id
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punishment is essential. RJ programs "complement rather than replace the
existing criminal justice system." 05
But the punishment is different: it is not merely symbolic, nor is it aimed
merely at deterrence, whether specific or general. Rather, the offender's
restoration is enhanced by his voluntary participation and cooperation in the
process. His voluntary agreement to repair or compensate "expresses his
understanding of the wrongs committed and harms caused, as well as his
willingness to make amends." 106 A restorative outcome is, by definition, an
agreement. 107 RJ thus provides the offender "with an opportunity to make
meaningful reparation." 0 8 Punishment is a means, not an end; restoration is
the end.1 09
As RJ evolved in practice, several core practices emerged. Both the
offender(s) and the victim(s) participate directly and personally in a process of
speaking about their role in the crime and listening to the other's narrative.
Each talks about what occurred, why it occurred, and the harm it caused. The
offender acknowledges his conduct and its wrongfulness, and apologizes to the
victim(s). The victim(s) draw into a deeper understanding of the causes,
sometimes systemic, of the crime, and can sometimes work toward an attitude
of forgiveness (but not forgetfulness) of the act. All persons contribute to a
determination of the appropriate restitution. Among the goals of restitution is
the reintegration of the wrongdoer into the larger community. Ideally, the
wrongdoer and the victim achieve a degree of reconciliation and a shared
understanding of appropriate social norms. Both then try to adopt a future-
oriented perspective that focuses on the rebuilding of social relationships.110
These practices expose deeper truths about state-sanctioned criminality, allow
for deeper understandings among the perpetrators and the victims, and can
allow a society to "begin anew with transformative understandings of both its
past and its future."111
The suggestion that this theory of punishment could apply to any
meaningful extent to multinational corporate crime will give rise to three
objections. The first is that RJ is designed for traditional crimes involving
natural-person offenders and discrete victims, not large-scale institutional
crimes. And the premise is to a large extent true: RJ tends to be most widely
practiced and discussed in relation to traditional, discrete crimes involving
smaller communities and utilizing alternative sentencing procedures such as
victim-offender mediation, community and family group conferencing, circle
sentencing, and peacemaking circles.112
05 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 7, at 13.
106 Walgrave, supra note 96, at 62.
1 0 7 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 7, at 7.
108 Id. at 11.
109 Walgrave, supra note 96, at 64.
110 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 90, at 164.
1ll Id. at 169.
I12 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 7, at 14-15.
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But RJ has since expanded, and arguably its most-widely recognized form
today is indeed a large-scale institutional crime with dispersed victims: the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In the 1990s restorative justice
practices moved from individual acts of wrongdoing to systematic wrongdoing
by state actors, such as civil wars and illegitimate regimes such as
apartheid.11 3 Since then, more than twenty-five developing countries have
instituted variations of restorative justice principles to heal from large-scale
crimes in which the state participated. If RJ can apply to crimes committed on
this scale, by institutional actors against broad communities, it can no less
easily apply to corporate crimes.
Skeptics may counter with two additional points, both of which are refuted
by the same body of evidence. First, a difference allegedly remains between
the state crimes that truth and reconciliation commissions address, and white-
collar crimes. While the former had concededly given rise to RJ approaches,
applying RJ to multinational corporate crime may be unworkable, and at any
rate is normatively unpalatable.1 14 Second, skeptics will argue that even if RJ
for white-collar crime is workable in theory, the enforcement agencies will
never embrace such an outlandish and academic proposition.11 5
Neither is true. For twenty-five years, the U.S. Department of Justice has
applied alternative sentencing practices to white-collar defendants. In
conjunction with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the DOJ has
developed a robust and well-defined practice of what is called the
"supplemental sentence." The civil-side version of these sentences is perhaps
better known, as it has a catchier moniker: the Supplemental Environmental
Project, or SEP. But an almost identical practice exists in criminal
enforcement, and this practice resounds in RJ themes.
In recent years supplemental projects have increased in popularity and
visibility. The DOJ has provided several reasons why this is so, all of which
readily apply to extraterritorial white-collar crime. First, prosecutors "want to
rectify the wrongs" caused by violations, and feel that more conventional
1 13 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 90, at 169.1 14 Some scholars have discussed, however tentatively, the possibility of applying RJ
to white-collar crime. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 7, at 62-66. One of the founders of the
restorative justice movement, John Braithwaite of Australia National University, has
argued for its applicability to corporate crime. Id. He finds that when state regulators
participate in negotiations with corporate managers or industry leaders, the resulting
enforcement actions are more flexible and realistic, and the punishment is generally much
more effective than traditional deterrence measures in promoting corporate compliance.
Id.; see Marianne L6schnig-Gspandl, Corporations, Crime and Restorative Justice, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN CONTEXT: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND DIRECTIONS 145, 145
(Elmar G.M. Weitekamp & Hans-Jfirgen Kerner eds., 2003).
115 The U.S. Department of Justice has, in other contexts, explicitly embraced RJ in the
context of other areas of crime. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IDENTIFYING CULTURALLY
RESPONSIVE VICTIM-CENTERED RESTORATIVE JUSTICE STRATEGIES (2012), available at
http://ojp.gov/ovc/grants/pdftxt/FY2012 
_Identifying_Culturally_ResponsiveVictim.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/GR25-24CB.
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criminal sentences fail to do so. Second, corporate defendants frequently wish
to perform community service and actually prefer it to simply paying a fine,
even where the service may prove more expensive. Third, judges often feel
that they are "doing more good for the community" by using the settlement
funds for community service instead of depositing those funds in the U.S.
treasury. 1 16
Note how naturally these three policy goals would apply to many forms of
white-collar crime; they are in no way unique to environmental violations.
Indeed, they are especially applicable to extraterritorial bribery, where
multiple stakeholders have for years criticized modem enforcement for its
failure to compensate the victims and otherwise improve the conditions in the
communities where the bribes occurred." 7 As is always the case with
extraterritorial enforcement, the crime occurred overseas, but the fine is
deposited in the U.S. treasury. The real victims-those impacted directly by
the crime-obviously receive scant benefit from the deposit.11 8
Notice also the obvious RJ themes in this analysis. The prosecutors wish
to remedy the harm and not merely punish the defendant. Corporate
defendants often express a preference for community service; though they may
well be motivated by concerns for reputation and, by extension, long-term
profits, they nonetheless are seeking to restore their relationship to the
community to its pre-crime state. And the judges also see greater community
benefits in the supplemental sentences; more to the point, they believe that
these benefits are a legitimate and appropriate aim of criminal sentencing.
Several recent examples of supplemental sentences illustrate this. In 2009,
a gas company paid a total of $18 million for illegally storing mercury. The
sentence included a $6 million criminal fine and $12 million in payments to
various local community initiatives to support environmental remediation and
1 16 Kris Dighe, Organizational Community Service in Environmental Crimes Cases,
U.S. Arr'Y BULL., July 2012, at 100, 100, available at http://www.justice.gov
lusao/eousa/foiareading room/usab6004.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TN3Y-3L9G.
117 See Letter from Alexander W. Sierck to Robert S. Khuzami, Dir., Enforcement
Div., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://www.fcpablog.com
/blog/2012/3/16/african-ngo-asks-for-distribution-of-fcpa-recoveries.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/2RVR-E7XK; see also Matthew C. Turk, A Political Economy Approach to
Reforming the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 325, 336-40
(2013).
118 Moreover, FCPA enforcement has, perhaps unwittingly, supplied one high-profile
example of a quasi-restorative approach to criminal enforcement. In settling the case of
James Giffen, the United States arranged with officials in Kazakhstan and Switzerland to
release the $80 million in alleged bribes from their Swiss accounts and establish a trust
fund to be managed by a Kazakhstani NGO. David Glovin, Oil Dealer Giffen Avoids
Prison in Onetime Bribe Case, BLOOMBERG L., Nov. 19, 2010, at 3. This fund was to be
used to pay for programs for poor children and improve transparency in the Kazakh oil
industry. Id.
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education projects and children's health initiatives. 119 In 2010, a ship
management firm paid a total of $10 million to settle criminal violations of the
Oil Pollution Act for causing and covering up an oil spill after one of its ships
hit the San Francisco Bay Bridge. Pursuant to the plea agreement, $2 million
of the total $10 million will fund marine environmental projects in San
Francisco Bay. 120 In 2012, a producer of pesticides agreed to pay a criminal
fine and perform community service to settle eleven criminal violations of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act in relation to applying
insecticides to its wild bird food products. In addition to the $4 million
criminal fine, the defendant contributed $500,000 to various organizations that
protect bird habitat in the immediate vicinity of the violations to fund
conservation, research, and education. 121
But 2013 proved to be the true zenith of community service sentences for
environmental white-collar criminals, producing two especially high-profile
cases. The first was Wal-Mart, which plead guilty to six criminal counts of
violating the Clean Water Act for illegally handling and disposing of
hazardous materials at its retail stores across the United States. Wal-Mart was
sentenced to pay a $40 million criminal fine, and an additional $20 million that
will fund various community service projects, including opening a $6 million
Retail Compliance Assistance Center that will help retail stores across the
nation learn how to properly handle hazardous waste. 122
However, the largest and most significant sentence came in the BP Gulf of
Mexico settlement. Not only was it the largest community service sentence in
environmental enforcement history, but BP also paid the largest criminal fine
of any kind in all of U.S. history: $4 billion, over three times larger than the
next-largest criminal resolution ever paid.1 23 The resolution is structured so
119Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Southern Union Company Is Penalized $18
Million for Illegally Storing Mercury at a Rhode Island Site 1 (Oct. 2, 2009), available at
http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/2009/October/09-enrd-1070.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/XT9N-AREE.
120 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Shipping Firm Sentenced to Pay $10 Million
for Causing Cosco Busan Oil Spill and Coverup 1 (Feb. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/February/10-enrd-168.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/435U-VDXU.
121 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Scotts Miracle-Gro Will Pay $12.5 Million in
Criminal Fines and Civil Penalties for Violations of Criminal Pesticide Laws 2 (Sept. 7,2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/September/12-enrd-1088.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/Y7KT-88AZ. Scotts also paid civil penalties and performed
additional service projects related to its civil liability. See id.
122 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Wal-Mart Pleads Guilty to Federal
Environmental Crimes, Admits Civil Violations and Will Pay More than $81 Million 2(May 28, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2013/May/13-enrd-6 11 .tml,
archived at http://perma.cc/NE36-DNXA. Wal-Mart also pled guilty to violating the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act by failing to properly handle pesticides.
Id. at 1.
123 The previous largest criminal resolution was $1.3 billion, paid by Pfizer in 2009 for
off-label pharmaceutical marketing. See Reasons for Accepting Plea Agreement at 11 n. 15,
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that more than half of this recovery will fund projects to compensate those
communities and ecosystems most directly harmed by the spill. As the
government's own press release explained:
[A]pproximately $2.4 billion of the $4.0 billion criminal recovery is
dedicated to acquiring, restoring, preserving and conserving-in consultation
with appropriate state and other resource managers-the marine and coastal
environments, ecosystems and bird and wildlife habitat in the Gulf of Mexico
and bordering states harmed by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. This portion
of the criminal recovery will also be directed to significant barrier island
restoration and/or river diversion off the coast of Louisiana to further benefit
and improve coastal wetlands affected by the oil spill. An additional $350
million will be used to fund improved oil spill prevention and response
efforts in the Gulf through research, development, education and training.
124
The money is going primarily to the National Fish and Wildlife
Foundation, an independent, non-profit conservation group.1 2
5 An additional
$350 million will go to the National Academy of Sciences for oil spill
prevention, education, research, and training.1 26 These organizations are
required under the court order to spend the monies on projects specifically
related to the oil spill to the extent possible.1 27 These penalties are in addition
to the required monitors, audits, training programs, and other internal reforms.
Notice again the RJ themes in these environmental examples. The
sentences directly repair the harm that resulted from the violation, thus
restoring the victims. Through research and education, the broader causes of
the harm are studied and addressed; the sentences work toward prevention not
merely by imposing a fine that would deter other prospective violators, but by
changing the environment that gave rise to the violation. To identify the most
effective measures, the defendant consults members of the local community
with particular expertise.
Commentators have consistently noted the RJ themes of these sentences,
and the ways in which they move substantially beyond deterrence-based
approaches to more effectively remedy and prevent harms. The ABA
United States v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., No. 12-292 (E.D. La. Jan. 20. 2013),
available at http://wwwjustice.gov/criminal/vns/docs/ 2013/01/2013-01-30-bp-exploration-
reasons-for-accepting-plea-agreement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/T2L7-SA8X.
124 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, BP Exploration and Production Inc.
Agrees to Plead Guilty to Felony Manslaughter, Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of
Congress Surrounding Deepwater Horizon Incident (Nov. 15, 2012), available at
http://wwwjustice.gov/opalpr/ 2012/November/12-ag-1369.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/C4T4-B6MM.
125 Guilty Plea Agreement Exhibit B at 16, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod.,
Inc., No. 12-292 (E.D. La. Nov. 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa
/resources/433 20121115143613990027.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TQ8G-73SA.
127 See Order at 16-19, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., No. 12-292
(E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/vns/docs/ 2013
/01/2013-01-29-bp-exploration-order.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/D5H9-EBCB.
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explained that these sentences are designed to "improve or repair relationships
among all stakeholders (i.e., impacted communities, facilities, and
government, at all levels) following the environmental violation."1 28 More to
the point, Michael L. Rustad, Thomas H. Koenig, and Erica R. Ferreira
provide an extensive case-study analysis of the RJ themes of supplemental
sentences, observing that they "creatively combine[] both deterrence-based
punishment through . .. penalties and restorative justice principles in the form
of mitigation projects . . . ."129 Notably, those authors suggest that "[o]ther
regulatory agencies should consider adopting restorative justice insights in
designing remedies" for other forms of white-collar crime. 130
This Article will shortly provide an outline for doing that very thing. But
further context is necessary to understanding how and why these sentences are
authorized under existing federal law. The following section explains how
constitutional pressures have shaped the formation of the guidelines that would
now apply to any such sentences.
B. Authorization in the U.S. Constitution
Congress and various federal agencies have argued for years about
whether the U.S. Constitution permits an enforcement agency to unilaterally
divert de facto criminal penalties to community service projects. Supplemental
sentences walk a fine line between the Executive's enforcement authority131
128NICHOLAS TARG & DAVID JUNG, Preface to PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST.,
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS: A FIFTY STATE SURVEY WITH MODEL
PRACTICES 3 (2007), available at http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/plri/ABA
HastingsSEPreport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HT5H-X9NL; see Dika Kuoh,
Leveraging Enforcement to Enhance Community: The Use of Supplemental Environmental
Projects to Promote Environmental Justice 3 (May 2013) (unpublished Masters thesis,
Duke University), available at http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/6849,
archived at http://perma.cc/5H9Y-MF95.
129 Michael L. Rustad et al., Restorative Justice to Supplement Deterrence-Based
Punishment: An Empirical Study and Theoretical Reconceptualization of the EPA's Power
Plant Enforcement Initiative, 2000-2011, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 428 (2013).
1301d.
131 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. In Federalist 58, Madison wrote that
"they [(Congress)], in a word, hold the purse .... This power over the purse may, in
fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any
constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a
redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary
measure."
THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 284-85 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003). So too did
the Supreme Court hold that "no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been
appropriated by an act of Congress." Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308,321 (1937) (citing Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 291 (1851)); see Robert C. Byrd, The
Control of the Purse and the Line Item Veto Act, 35 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 297, 297 (1998);
Richard D. Rosen, Funding "Non-Traditional" Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of
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and the congressional power of the purse. 132 Seeking to protect its power from
executive encroachment, Congress enacted the Miscellaneous Receipts Act
(MRA),1 33 requiring that any money received "for the Government" from any
source be deposited into the U.S. treasury.1 34 The MRA is "intended to
preserve Congressional prerogatives to appropriate funds as provided for in the
U.S. Constitution."l 35 Sentencing policy must therefore allow the Executive
Branch to exercise its settlement authority without encroaching upon
Congress's appropriation power.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, various enforcement agencies-including
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,1 36 the Nuclear Regulatory
a Presidential Power of the Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998); Kate Stith, Congress'
Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1349 (1988); see also Charles Tiefer, Controlling
Federal Agencies by Claims on Their Appropriations? The Takings Bill and the Power of
the Purse, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 501, 502 (1996).
132 The Judiciary Act of 1789 vests plenary authority over the legal affairs of the
United States in the Attorney General, and Congress created the Attorney General's
statutory authority to conduct litigation on behalf of the United States when establishing
the Department of Justice in 1870. Todd David Peterson, Protecting the Appropriations
Power: Why Congress Should Care About Settlements at the Department of Justice, 2009
BYU L. REV. 327, 342-43.
133 Miscellaneous Receipts Act, Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 948 (1982) (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (2012)).
134 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING GUIDANCE IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROSECUTIONS,
INCLUDING THE USE OF SUPPLEMENTAL SENTENCING MEASURES, DEVELOPED BY THE U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION,
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES SECTION IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES
POLICY COMMITTEE B-11 (2000) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDANCE].
135 Memorandum from Walker B. Smith, Dir., Office of Regulatory Enforcement, U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Reg'l Counsel, Reg'1 Enforcement Div. Dirs., & Reg'1 Media Div.
Dirs. 2 (Oct. 31, 2002) [hereinafter Nexus Memo], available at http://www2.epa.gov
/sites/production/files/documents/sepnexus-mem.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6D8M-
Z2VR.
136 In 1983, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) sought an opinion
from the Government Accounting Office concerning its proposed policy of accepting a
defendant's promise to make a donation to an educational institution as all or part of a
settlement agreement. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, B-210210, 1983 WL
197623 (Comp. Gen. Sept. 14, 1983). The CFTC specifically wanted to know if achieving
its educational goals through the proposed plan would violate the MRA. See id. In striking
down the proposal, the Comptroller General held that the donations would effectively be
penalties, which are subject to deposit into the Treasury under the MRA, and that the
CFTC's means of enforcement are "specifically defined" by Congress and that settlement
authority should be "limited to statutorily authorized prosecutorial objectives: correction or
termination of a condition or practice, punishment, and deterrence." Id. The Comptroller
General further took issue with the fact that a charged party would donate funds to "an
educational institution that has no relationship to the violation and that has suffered no
injury from the violation." Id. In concluding that the CFTC must collect those penalties and
deposit them into the Treasury in compliance with the MRA, the Comptroller General
added, "[t]he Commission may not circumvent the receipt of a penalty to accomplish a
separate objective." Id.
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Commission, 137 and ultimately the Environmental Protection Agencyl 38 -
claimed the authority to use a portion of civil settlements to fund community
service projects, with repeated pushback from the Comptroller General. Then
in 1993, the Comptroller General finally acknowledged that the U.S.
Constitution and the MRA may indeed authorize the funding of such projects
under certain, carefully prescribed conditions.1 39 It explained that the
Government's
discretionary authority to 'compromise, or remit, with or without conditions,'
civil penalties . . . empowers it to adjust penalties to reflect the special
circumstances of the violation or concessions exacted from the violator, but
does not extend to remedies unrelated to the correction of the violation in
question. 140
This "adjustment" of penalties to reflect the violator's "concessions"-
provided those concessions are "related" to the violation-marked the birth of
the supplemental sentence. The Comptroller General essentially conceded that
such projects could actually fall within the Executive's legitimate enforcement
1 37 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 70 Comp. Gen. 17 (1990) (regarding the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's authority to mitigate civil penalties in exchange for
contributions to nuclear safety research projects at universities and other nonprofit
institutions). Under the Atomic Energy Act, the NRC is authorized to impose civil
monetary penalties for violations of licensing requirements and to compromise, mitigate, or
remit those penalties as well. See 42 U.S.C. § 2282(a) (2012). The Comptroller General
applied a similar line of reasoning as in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, B-210210,
1983 WL 197623 (Comp. Gen. Sept. 14, 1983), in determining that the proposed
alternative was not within the Commission's congressionally delegated powers. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 70 Comp. Gen. 17 (1990). The Commission's discretion to
impose monetary penalties, "like CFTC's prosecutorial discretion, does not empower the
NRC to impose punishments unrelated to prosecutorial objectives." Id. The Comptroller
General elaborated, "[u]nder NRC's proposal, a violator would contribute funds to an
institution that, in all likelihood, has no relationship to the violations and has suffered no
injury from the violation." Id The Comptroller General again maintained that allowing an
agency to impose punishments unrelated to prosecutorial objectives would allow that
agency to circumvent the MRA. Id. This opinion also added that the proposal would violate
the general rule against augmentation of appropriation. Id.
138 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, B-247155, 1992 WL 726317 (Comp. Gen. July
7, 1992). The EPA contended that its power to compromise or remit civil penalties with or
without conditions under section 205 of the Clean Air Act provided a legal basis for its
practice of funding public awareness projects with civil penalties. The opinion rejected the
EPA's proposal, finding that using penalty money to fund such projects would violate the
MRA in all the ways it had previously explained: where the proposed project was not
designed to remedy and prevent the specific harms caused by the violation, it would violate
congressional appropriations power generally and the MRA specifically. Id.
139 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, B-247155.2, 1993 WL 798227 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 1,
1993).
1 40 d. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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authority and not run afoul of either Congress's Article I power of the purse or
the MRA.141
Within two years, the EPA would translate the Comptroller General's
guidance into an Interim Revised Supplemental Environmental Projects
Policy.1 42 This publication also introduced the catchy civil-side moniker of the
Supplemental Environmental Project, or "SEP." The EPA clarified these civil
enforcement guidelines in 1998, when it promulgated its Final EPA
Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy.143 The DOJ then translated these
civil enforcement guidelines into criminal sentencing guidance in a 2000 DOJ
memo. 144 The 2000 guidelines would be rearticulated in a 2012 United States
Attorneys' Bulletin.145 And as far back as the mid-1990s, the EPA and DOJ
were administering supplemental sentences with some frequency.1 46
The DOJ has explained that in addition to the goals of deterrence and
corporate compliance, supplemental sentencing measures can "more fully
remedy the harm to the environment and the community caused by the
violation ... ."147 It articulates several guidelines that, if followed, can keep
the sentence within executive authority. Notice again how readily they transfer
to anti-bribery law specifically and extraterritorial white-collar crime
generally.
The first and most fundamental requirement, arising directly from the
Government Accountability Office opinions, is the nexus requirement. "Nexus
is the relationship between the violation and the proposed project[,]"1 48 and
the purpose of the nexus is to ensure that any harm or threatened harm to
victims or the environment is actually addressed.1 49 It further ensures that
supplemental projects "do not run afoul of any Constitutional and statutory
requirements" by circumventing congressional authority to allocate the monies
of the U.S. treasury. 50 The enforcement agencies have developed three
circumstances in which the nexus may be satisfied: first, where the project is
"designed to reduce the likelihood that similar violations will occur in the
future"; second, where the project "reduces the adverse impact" of the
violation; or third, where the project "reduces the overall risk" to the
141 Id
142 Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg.
24,796 (May 5, 1998).
143 Id.
1 4 4 See ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GuIDANCE, supra note 134, at A-1.
145 Dighe, supra note 116, at 104.
1 46 For examples of early supplemental sentences, see ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING
GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at B-1 to B-20.
147Id. at A-1. The measures can also "encourage more efficient environmental
technologies and corporate management practices, leverage greater environmental and
public health improvements, and advance important priorities like pollution prevention."
Id.
1 4 8 Id. at B-15 n.49.
149 d.
1 50 Nexus Memo, supra note 135.
3952015]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
community affected by the violation.151 Notably, EPA Guidelines specifically
mention that a nexus can exist even where the project "will involve activities
outside of the United States."l 52
Secondly, and relatedly, the enforcement agencies cannot approve any
project that supplements, or appears to supplement, either their own
appropriations or the appropriations of another federal agency.1 53 This "anti -
augmentation principle" holds that an improper augmentation of
appropriations occurs in any of three circumstances: (1) where a supplemental
project helps to carry out a project for which the enforcement agencies or other
agencies already have funding; (2) where the federal government is required
by law to carry out the project; or (3) where the project is already in existence
and already receives federal funding.1 54 For this reason, the supplemental
project must specifically address the harm that resulted from the violation,
and/or take new measures to prevent similar future harms. Ultimately, if there
is a close relationship between the violation and the supplemental project, the
enforcement agencies have the discretion to consider the cost of the project
when calculating the overall settlement; "if there is no nexus, then the
[agencies do] not have that discretion."' 5 5
Third, the defendant must retain full responsibility for completion of the
project; it may not merely give a cash donation to an organization. A cash
donation, absent responsibility for completion of a discrete project, would
violate the MRA.156 Any trust fund created by a supplemental sentence must
be managed by a non-federal entity-whether a charity, educational
institution, public interest group, or other organization-that is chosen without
favoritism or the appearance of favoritism.' 57 The trust fund should be
managed by neutral third parties, or the money may be deposited in an escrow
account and distributed at regular intervals until the project is completed.
Federal officials may provide technical oversight to ensure that the project is
151 Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy Issued, 63 Fed. Reg.
24,796, 24,798 (May 5, 1998).
1521d.
153 Nexus Memo, supra note 135, at 23; see also ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING
GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at B-l i.
1 54 Nexus Memo, supra note 135, at 2-3; see also Motor Coach Indus., Inc. v. Dole,
725 F.2d 958, 964-65 (4th Cir. 1984); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 2 PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 6-162 to 6-163 (3d ed. 2004).
155 Nexus Memo, supra note 135, at 2.
156 Memorandum from John Peter Suarez, Assistant Adm'r, EPA Office of
Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, to Regional Counsels et al. ¶ II.A. (Dec. 15, 2003),
available at http://www 2 .epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/seps-thirdparties.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/GYN2-XW3F. This prohibition on cash donations was first
articulated by the Office of Legal Counsel opinion concerning a Department of Interior
proposal. Steuart Transp. Co., 4B Op. O.L.C. 684, 684 (1980).1 5 7 See ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at B- 18 to B- 19.
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consistent with the sentence but may not actually manage the project or its
funding.' 5 8
The memos enumerate various permitted sentencing objectives:
remediation and restoration (taking steps to restore and enhance the
environment near the site of the violation); prevention (beyond what is already
required by federal environmental law, with the aim of developing innovative
new processes); restitution payments to local agencies for their remediation
costs; setting up trust funds for the long-term monitoring, restoration, and
preservation of the resources impacted by the violation; environmental
education (in the form of formal educational programs, regulatory training,
and speeches to trade groups); and public apologies (in newspapers and other
public media).1 59 Projects that have violated one or more of these guidelines
include: general educational or public environmental awareness projects, e.g.,
conducting tours of an environmental facility or promoting recycling;
contributions to research at a college or university; conducting a project of
benefit to the harmed community, but unrelated to environmental protection,
e.g., making a charitable organization or donating playground equipment; and
studies or assessments that do not address the problems they identify.
Note that these guidelines are in no way specific to environmental
violations. The constitutional context bears this out; so too do the federal
sentencing guidelines themselves. The next section describes how the
guidelines now authorize supplemental sentences, and in a way that is fully
transferable to other areas of enforcement.
C. Authorization in the Sentencing Guidelines
The DOJ could immediately adopt the supplemental sentence in
extraterritorial white-collar enforcement. It now lies within the agency's
prosecutorial discretion because it is authorized under existing federal law. But
1 58 Id Additionally, the defendant may not obtain tax relief for the value of the
supplemental sentence if the same funds were used to pay a fine. Id. The principle
difference between civil and criminal supplemental environmental sentences concerns the
relationship between the cost of the supplemental project and the monetary fine. On the
civil side, the EPA has worked a complex and highly specific five-step procedure for
determining the settlement amount without a supplemental project, the cost of the project,
and the extent of penalty mitigation. See id. Generally speaking, the mitigation should not
exceed 80% of the project's cost. See id. On the criminal side, no such procedure exists.
See id. Though the sentencing guidelines provide these steps for other types of crimes, and
provide the guidance for environmental crimes on remediation, community service, and
probation, the sentencing guidelines expressly do not apply to the calculation of the fine for
environmental violations. See Final EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy
Issued, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,796, 24,797 (May 5, 1998). Accordingly, though contemporary
criminal sentencing in environmental law will frequently involve a combination of
supplemental sentences and monetary fines, the extent to which the fine is discounted for
the cost of the project is apparently entirely within the prosecutor's discretion. Id
1 5 9 See ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at A-6 to A-7.
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the statutory authority for the supplemental sentence does not derive from the
environmental statutes or from some kind of specialized amendment to federal
sentencing law. Rather, it derives from the standard sentencing sources: the
Sentencing Reform Act and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
This subsection will first describe how the guidelines authorize these
supplemental sentences. It shows that RJ is actually embedded in the very
structure of the guidelines, though in nascent form. It then describes how the
supplemental sentence could be adapted to extraterritorial white-collar crime
without any new legal authorization.
Chapter 8 of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual provides a distinct set of
procedures for the sentencing of organizational defendants. The prosecutor (in
a case settled out of court, as anti-bribery cases virtually always are)1 60 first
determines the offense level based in part on the value of the benefit received
and, consulting a chart in the Guidelines, calculates the base fine.'' She then
determines a culpability score, which takes into account the size of the
organization, the level of personnel involved in the crime, and the extent of the
organization's cooperation and acceptance of responsibility. 162 This
culpability score produces two "multipliers," a maximum and a minimum. 163
The base fine, multiplied by each of the multipliers, then produces a fine
range.1 64
But the Guidelines then permit the prosecutor to set an ultimate fine that is
below the sentencing range; this is known as a "downward departure," and is
permitted for either of two reasons. The first is assistance to the enforcement
authorities in the investigation or prosecution of another person, whether an
organization or an individual (not affiliated with the defendant).1 65 The second
reason, which is particularly germane to the present inquiry, is remedial costs
arising from the offense.1 66
Two examples can illustrate how the DOJ specifically applies these
provisions to extraterritorial white-collar enforcement, again using anti-bribery
law as an example. Bizjet, a U.S.-based company that provides aircraft
maintenance services to customers around the world, admitted to bribing
government officials in Mexico and Panama to win and retain business.1 67 The
DOJ calculated the offense level, considering the base offense and the value of
1 6 0 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 85, at 74-77 (explaining the government's
various methods of settling cases without going to trial).
161 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 8, §§ 8C2.3-2.4.
1 62 1d. § 8C2.5.
1 63 Id § 8C2.6.
1 64 Id. § 8C2.7.
1 65 Id. § 8C4.1.
1 66 Id. § 8C4.9.
167 Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1-2, United States v. Bizjet Int'l Sales &
Support, Inc., No. 12-CR-61-CVE (N.D. Okla. Mar. 14, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bizjet/2012-03-14-bizjet-deferred-
prosecution-agreement.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/W5YZ-2V58.
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the benefit, producing a base fine of $28.5 million.1 68 The culpability score
was then determined based on a base score, the size of the organization, and its
voluntary disclosure and cooperation. 169 The culpability score then produced
two multipliers, one high and one low.1 70 The base fine, multiplied by the
culpability multipliers, produced a sentence range of $17.1 million to $34.2
million.1 71 However, the ultimate fine was $11.8 million, a 30% reduction off
the bottom of the range.1 72 This reduction was appropriate given, inter alia,
Bizjet's "extensive" remediation.1 73 The remediation included implementation
of a corporate compliance program, a review of its internal controls, and
periodic reports to the DOJ.1 74
Biomet, a U.S.-based company that manufactured and sold orthopedic
devices, used its subsidiaries in Argentina, Brazil, China, and Sweden to bribe
doctors. Because these doctors were employees of state-owned hospitals, the
DOJ treated the doctors as "foreign officials." 75 Per the Guidelines, the DOJ
calculated the base offense, considering the base offense level, the number of
bribes, the value of the benefit, and Bizjet's "substantial assistance in the
prosecution of others," rendering a base fine of $13.5 million. It then
calculated the culpability score based on a base score, the size of the
organization, and Biomet's full cooperation and acceptance of responsibility,
again producing two multipliers. The base fine multiplied by the culpability
multipliers rendered a fine range of $21.6 million to $43.2 million. However,
as with Biomet, the ultimate sentence was $17.28 million, a 20% reduction of
the bottom of the range. This reduction was "appropriate" due in large part to
Bizjet's "extraordinary remediation."l 76 That remediation included the
implementation of a corporate compliance program, the engagement of an
independent corporate compliance monitor, and periodic compliance reporting
to the DOJ.
These anti-bribery examples show that the DOJ already grants downward
departures from the sentencing range for remediation. However, they also
show that the allowed remediation has historically been limited to compliance
programs, monitors, and reporting. Nevertheless, the Guidelines also allow
remediation to include programs funded by the defendant that address the
harms that the violation caused. The Guidelines describe these non-monetary
penalties (the compliance programs, monitors, reporting requirements, etc.) as
"conditions of probation."1 77 They permit these conditions of probation in a
1 6 8 Id at 5.
1691d
170 Id
171 See id.
1721d.
173 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 167, at 3-7.
1 74 d 7-8.
1 7 5 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 85, at 19-2 1.
176 Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 175, at 5.
177 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 8, ch. 8, pt. D, introductory cmt.
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number of circumstances, two of which are particularly relevant here: where it
is "necessary to ensure that changes are made within the organization to
reduce the likelihood of future criminal conduct," 78 and to "ensure
completion of community service." 1 79 The remediation that the DOJ already
requires-compliance programs, monitors, etc.-falls into the first category: it
is necessary to ensure changes within the organization.
The supplemental sentence falls within the second category of probation:
community service. Probationary sentences directed to community service
derive their authority from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which
restructured federal sentencing and established the U.S. Sentencing
Commission.180 That statute authorizes the court, as a discretionary condition
of probation, to order the defendant to "work in community service."181 The
legislative history explains that community service may be "useful" where the
victims "cannot be readily identified."1 82 This is of course frequently true in
environmental law and virtually always true in anti-bribery law: the victims
can be a very broad group of individuals. Like the Sentencing Reform Act, the
Guidelines provide that where the victims are not identifiable an "order of
probation requiring community service" is appropriate.1 83 This community
service should be designed "to reduce or eliminate the harm threatened, or to
repair the harm caused by the offense, when that harm or threatened harm
would not otherwise be remedied." 84 Community service then can, or must,
both remedy past harm and prevent future harm.1 85
The supplemental sentence would thus easily fit into existing FCPA
sentencing procedures. Following standard procedure, the DOJ would
178 Id. § 8D1.1(a)(6).
1 79 Id. § 8DI.1(a)(1).
180 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
181 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(12) (2012).
182 ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at B-1.
183 The very first policy statement of the "Sentencing of Organizations" chapter of the
Guidelines provides that "the court must, whenever practicable, order the organization to
remedy any harm caused by the offense." U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 8, ch. 8,
introductory cmt. That is, the first principle of federal organizational sentencing is not to
deter future harm; it is to remedy past harm. Accordingly, the first substantive section of
the organizational chapter is indeed entitled "Remedying Harm from Criminal Conduct,
and Effective Compliance and Ethics Program." Id. § 8B. Notably, the DOJ reads the
Guidelines to "support[] the concept that supplemental sentences are important and
appropriate." ENVIRONMENTAL SENTENCING GUIDANCE, supra note 134, at B-5.18 4 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 8, § 8B1, introductory cmt
185 Moreover, the community service is required to "provide[] a means for preventive
or corrective action directly related to the offense and therefore serve[s] one of the
purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." Id. § 8B1.3, cmt. And those
purposes extend well beyond deterrence: in addition to providing "adequate deterrence,"
the statute provides that criminal sentencing should also, inter alia, protect the public from
further violations, promote respect for the law, and provide the defendant with educational
training or other "correctional treatment." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2012).
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calculate the base fine and the culpability multipliers, and set a fine range. It
would then consider whether to grant a downward departure. It might grant a
departure based on the already familiar terms of probation: compliance
programs, internal control improvements, outside corporate monitor, and the
submission of periodic reports to the DOJ. But in addition to these forms of
remediation, it would grant a further condition of probation-say an increase
from a 20% to a 30% departure-for the defendant's community service
projects.
The projects would fully comport with the DOJ's already existing
Guidelines for complying with the MRA. Accordingly, the Guidelines would
have a nexus to the violation, would not augment a project that is already
receiving federal funding, and the government would play no part in managing
the project or its funding.' 86
Following the Guidelines and the environmental precedents, the projects
could take a couple different forms. Focusing on prevention through
education, the defendant could fund a variety of training programs. These
programs would need to be specifically designed to prevent the conduct that
gave rise to the violation. They might focus on trade groups, government
officials, or business- and law-school students. The defendant might even
establish a training center that provided certification in anti-corruption
compliance, as recently occurred in environmental enforcement. The training
must be specifically designed to prevent the specific harms that the
defendant's violation had caused, must occur in the communities where the
violation occurred, and must be funded and managed entirely by the defendant
(or a third party).' 8 7
The projects might also seek to correct the harm that resulted from the
violation, or prevent similar harm in the future. 188 In the corruption space,
correcting past harms will sometimes prove impossible; in this regard, FCPA
violations are essentially different from environmental violations. However, an
FCPA defendant would seem uniquely positioned to identify preventative
measures that could reduce future harms. This need not be limited to training
programs. With the financial support made possible by the supplemental
sentence, the defendant could work in conjunction with outside experts
(NGOs, consultants, or academics) to write a detailed report. The report could
identify the conditions in the host country that gave rise to the violation and
develop a series of innovative reforms that would have prevented the violation.
These reforms might involve corporate governance, host-country governance,
investigative reporting, or enforcement among capital-exporters. They might
include the development of enforceable agreements or pacts among competitor
companies, the funding of other private-sector initiatives, or more formal legal
186 See supra Part III.B.
1 87 See supra Part III.B.
188 See supra Part III.B.
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reforms. The defendant, likely working through a third party, could then
undertake a sustained and well-funded effort to implement the reforms.
The following section shows how this idea could work out in a specific
(though hypothetical) enforcement action. It explains how a supplemental
sentence, based on the policies and aims of restorative justice, would comply
with the U.S. Constitution, the Miscellaneous Receipts Act, and the
Guidelines.
D. A New Proposal
This Article has exposed a fundamental paradox, if not a riddle, of
extraterritorial white-collar enforcement: we must reach the unreachable,
punish the unpunishable, alter the conduct of whole categories of persons who
lie beyond our jurisdiction. This riddle exists because deterrence-based
enforcement leads to increased levels of host-country bribery. Limited to a
one-dimensional focus on manipulating the incentives of those corporate
actors subject to its jurisdiction, it creates the conditions in which the criminal
conduct of other actors may proliferate. To resolve the paradox, or solve the
riddle, criminal punishment must impact, to the extent possible, the behavior
of foreign corporations and host-country government officials. The enforcing
jurisdiction cannot and will not eliminate criminal conduct by those actors; but
it can and should aspire to ensure that its own enforcement efforts do not make
the problem worse.
Restorative justice, as applied to multinational corporations, can resolve
the riddle in the following way. Imagine a multinational corporation (MNC)
with jurisdictional ties to the United States has allegedly committed several
FCPA violations in a particular developing country.1 89 To wit, in seeking to
gain government approval to enter this market, the MNC flew key officials
(and not their spouses) to a lavish offshore location where it hosted several
days of "preliminary negotiations."l 90 During the visit, the MNC provide
expensive gifts--cognac, designer clothing, and luxury box tickets to a high-
profile sporting event-to each of these officials. 191 Finally, the MNC
provided jobs to younger relatives of several of the officials. Once these high-
ranking officials approved the MNC's market entry, the MNC then needed to
build a number of facilities and sought the cooperation of local officials. It
hired a local attorney who specialized in obtaining government approvals. 92
That attorney coordinated the bribing of various local officials to obtain
building permits where the zoning regulations otherwise prohibited
189 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 85, at 11-12 (explaining the FCPA's
jurisdictional provisions).
190I. at 24 (discussing "reasonable and bona fide expenditures").
191 See id.
192 See id. at 21-23 (discussing third parties).
402 [Vol. 76:2
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
commercial property. So too did the local attorney bribe building inspectors to
permit cost-cutting construction measures that violated safety codes.
Once the allegations arose, the MNC followed the standard practice of
retaining an outside law firm to conduct an independent investigation and
prepared a report detailing its factual findings. 193 To receive cooperation
credit,1 94 the MNC fully cooperated with the DOJ including voluntarily
disclosing the investigation report. The defendant enters into a deferred
prosecution agreement that stipulates to a number of facts and provides a
sentencing range based on the Guidelines' procedures. Imagine that the base
fine is $50 million, and the sentencing range is $35 million to $65 million.
But the DOJ grants a 30% downward departure-as it has already shown
itself willing to dol 95-and requires the defendant to pay a fine of only $24.5
million. This downward departure is appropriate because the defendant has
agreed to a number of remedial conditions of probation: it has adopted various
internal controls, instituted a rigorous compliance program, and accepted an
independent corporate monitor.196 Additionally, the MNC has volunteered to
fund a series of community service projects. These projects will be designed to
help the particular local communities where the bribes occurred. 19
To design the projects, the MNC consulted various representatives of
those communities: civic leaders, NGOs, and local businesses. In these
consultations, the MNC sought to more fully understand how its conduct
impacted the community, which specific harms it caused, the extent to which
those harms can now be remedied, and how to prevent similar harms in the
future. The MNC also came to more fully understand the local cultural norms
surrounding corruption, and discovered that its conduct, which violated the
FCPA, fell into three categories: the locals perceived some of the MNC's
conduct as highly unusual and offensive (the lavish business trip, for
example); some was perceived as quite common, but still offensive (bribing
the local officials to violate safety and zoning regulations); and yet some of the
conduct was quite common and not particularly offensive (the cognac, clothes,
and tickets, for example). The MNC then used this feedback to determine
which forms of corruption it should try to remedy and prevent. That is, the
local community's definition of corruption, and not the U.S. enforcement
agencies', guides the project.
In consultation with internationally recognized anti-corruption experts, the
MNC develops three specific projects, proposing a specific timeline and cost
for each. The defendant agrees to completely finance the project and manage
193 See id. at 52-56 for an introduction to enforcement procedures.
194 For a discussion of the alleged "credit" that defendants receive for cooperating with
the government's investigation, see Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the Penitent:
Disproportionate Fines in Recent FCPA Enforcements and Suggested Improvements, 40
PUB. CONTRACT L.J. 393, 420-21 (2010).
19 5 See supra Part III.C.
19 6 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 8, § 8D1.4.
19 7 Id. §§ 8B1.3, introductory cmt., 8D1.3
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the payment. So too does the defendant assume full responsibility for
completing the project, likely through hiring a third party, and remains liable
for its non-completion. The cost of the proposed community service projects
then forms the basis of the additional downward departure: the defendant's
fine is reduced by a percentage of the projects' cost, as determined by the
prosecutor in her discretion.
The first such project is a small business-loan program for any merchants
who can demonstrate that their local business materially suffered as a result of
the MNC's bribes. This proposal is designed to remedy certain of the harms
that the defendant's conduct caused in disrupting local markets. The second
project is a training center for local businesses, attorneys, and government
officials, which offers training on how to conduct business with outside
companies without drawing them into violation of extraterritorial anti-bribery
laws. The center provides a certification that its graduates use to represent to
foreign companies that they were well versed in the prevention of bribery
violations.
Third, the MNC agrees to write a comprehensive report on its experience
of paying bribes in that country. 198 The report would concede no further facts
than were already made public in the deferred prosecution agreement (DPA).
Based only on those facts, the report would describe in detail which bribes the
MNC paid, and more importantly, why. It would further describe what the
MNC discovered about the adverse impact of their conduct on the local
community. And unlike the deferred prosecution agreement, the report would
then be translated into the local language and systematically publicized across
the local media.
This report would serve two purposes. First, it would be a sort of public
confession, written in the tone of a mea culpa. The MNC would admit to its
illicit payments (as it already has in the DPA) and acknowledge the harm that
these bribes caused in the local community.
But in the course of this confession, the report would also describe the
conditions in which the MNC felt the bribes were necessary. It would allude
to, if not outright detail, the behavior of our two other sets of actors. The first
would be the local government officials. The report would indicate where
bribes were reasonably thought necessary to obtain the government's approval,
either because the official committed outright extortion or because he simply
refused to do his job otherwise. Second, the report could also explain the
conduct of local and foreign competitor companies. These competitors might
be paying bribes to obtain an advantage, such that the defendant felt it could
not compete without doing the same, or the local competitors might routinely
engage in this conduct, and the government either does not care and expected
198 One of the "Recommended Conditions of Probation" in the Sentencing Guidelines
Manual is that the organization "at its expense" and in a specified "format and media" may
"publicize the nature of the offense committed, the fact of conviction, the nature of the
punishment imposed, and the steps that will be taken to prevent the recurrence of similar
offenses." Id. § 8D1.4(a).
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it or even demanded the same. The mea culpa, then, would simultaneously
expose the extent of the problem that existed prior to the defendant's
investment in that market.
The defendant MNC would design a plan to publicize this report in two
ways. First, and as indicated above, it would distribute the report across the
local media. Second, it would deliver the report to various international
organizations, particularly those charged with overseeing the implementation
of the various anti-corruption agreements: the United Nations Office of Drugs
and Crime (custodian of the UN Convention Against Corruption)1 99 and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (custodian of the
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials),200 as
well as the major relevant NGOs such as Transparency International. 201
This report, thus publicized, and in combination with the training facility,
would begin to improve the host-country conditions that precipitate bribery in
several ways. First, host-country officials would be educated in bribery-
reduction strategies.
This training would help, but of course these officials have material
incentives to continue accepting bribes. Where education and good will cannot
reduce the problem, the report steps in, and provides the second mechanism
for improving host-country conditions. In publicizing the company's report of
systemic bribery across the local and national media, local political pressures
are exerted on the government to effect reforms; consider Brazil or China as
powerful recent examples of this phenomenon.202
Third, in the hands of international organizations, the report can trigger the
levers of international diplomacy, exerting pressure on two kinds of countries.
Of course, where the host country has proven to be systemically complicit in
international bribery schemes, organizations will pressure the country to more
meaningfully enforce domestic bribery prohibitions. But so too will these
levers be brought to bear on the other capital-exporting nations whose
companies are participating in the host-country's bribery. That is, the non-
enforcing capital-exporting jurisdictions, whose companies pay bribes
overseas without fear of punishment, can be pressured to enact and enforce
extraterritorial bribery prohibitions. This is the story of the OECD's Anti-
Bribery Convention, in which recent years have shown a steady increase in
enforcement by member nations largely in response to the pressure of fellow
members. Germany, for example, which once publicly mocked the United
States for enacting the FCPA, has now become among the OECD's leading
199 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/58/4
(Oct. 31, 2003).200 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 58.
201 See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.transparency.org/ (last visited
Mar. 25, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/F9N9-NT45.
202 See, e.g., Taking to the Streets, EcoNOMIST (June 22, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/
2 1579857-bubbling-anger-about-high-prices-
corruption-and-poor-public-services-boils-over, archived at http://perma.cc/5WJC-AFKU.
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enforcers of its similar law.203 Through these levers, those companies that
were once substitute investors now become reluctant bribe payers. As the
number of jurisdictions enforcing an extraterritorial prohibition increases, and
the number of reluctant MNC bribe payers increases, rates of host-country
bribery decline.
Admittedly, these methods would only make a minor dent in the
prevalence of host-country bribery. They would constitute but a small part of a
much larger and more complex strategy for reducing such bribery. But recall
our aim:204 to reduce host-country bribery by somewhere between 4-11%.
Were that mark achieved, the enforcing country would have accomplished its
goal: to enforce an extraterritorial prohibition that actually improved the social
conditions of both the actual and prospective victims of multinational
corporate crime.
This accomplishment, at once modest and transformative, is made possible
by the uniquely three-dimensional approach of restorative justice.205 The
defendant does not merely pay a fine; it is forced to confront the victims of its
crime. Through the consultations with community leaders, the MNC is
confronted by, and listens to, the victims (and their representatives). 206 In then
deliberately broadcasting across the local media an admission of its guilt, the
MNC admits to its wrongdoing and acknowledges the harm it caused.
Perpetrator and victim thus hear each other's narratives, seeking understanding
and reconciliation. 207 The defendant then voluntarily participates in the
sentencing by designing community service projects and taking full
responsibility for their cost and completion. 208 The community has thus
achieved a fuller understanding of its past, and its future, and the norm
transgression is affirmed.209
The victims are restored both through remediation (such as the loan
program) and prevention (the training center and the political pressure to
implement reforms). The victim becomes empowered: its own account of the
crimes committed and the harms caused, informed by the community's own
cultural norms and social experience, forms the basis of the sentence. To the
extent that the defendant has thus repaired its reputation and restored a
measure of good will in the community, it can resume its business practices.
Now compliant with anti-bribery laws, it reintegrates into the very community
it once knowingly victimized and repairs the social processes it once damaged.
203 For a historical account of Germany's compliance with anti-bribery conventions,
see, for example, Germany - OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/germany-oecdanti-briberyconvention.htm (lastvisited
Mar. 5, 2015), archivedat http://perma.cc/M3JS-TFV2.
204 See supra Part III.C.
2 05 See supra Part IV.A.
206 See BRAfHWATTE, supra note 7, at 11.20 7 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 90, at 164.20 8 See E.S.C. Res. 2002/12, supra note 97, at 1.2.209 See Walgrave, supra note 96, at 61-62.
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However, the defendant's overall financial penalty is no less than a
traditional fine, and can actually be greater: the defendant's fine reduction may
be less than the full cost of the projects, as determined in the prosecutor's
discretion. The good will benefits to the corporation thus do not render the
sentence's deterrent value lower than a conventional fine. 210 Moreover, care
will be taken to ensure that the defendant corporation does not benefit in any
illicit way from the project; the project will likely be managed in large part by
a neutral third party, and the defendant may be required to submit periodic
reports to the DOJ. The corporation and the third party can likewise manage
the project with sufficient care to ensure that the host country's government or
third parties do not embezzle the money. The corporation will use its ample
resources to monitor the project and ensure that the money never passes into
any government official's hands, whether in the United States or the host
country.
This proposal is not without its drawbacks. The possibility that these anti-
corruption measures could become corrupted is of course omnipresent. Some
may argue that any gains from these projects will be offset by the loss in
revenue to the U.S. treasury. And yet others may simply maintain that the
United States has historically concerned itself too much, and not too little, with
"reforming" countries in transition. Finally, some will note that crime is a vast,
complex, and deeply-entrenched problem which the developed world's efforts,
no matter how innovative and well-meaning, cannot solve.
The latter point, at least, is certainly true. We will not eliminate bribery, or
corporate crime, whether overseas or within our own jurisdictions. Nor will we
eliminate murder; but this is hardly an argument against its prohibition. The
proposal developed here has a much more modest goal: to ensure that our
efforts to reduce overseas crime make the situation incrementally better or, at
very least, do not make the problem worse.
V. CONCLUSION
Two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases famously restricted laws that (once)
governed overseas corporate conduct: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
2 11
(concerning the Alien Tort Statute), and Morrison v. National Australian Bank
Ltd.212 (concerning Section l0b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). But
rumors of the death of extraterritorial application are greatly exaggerated.
Federal law continues to govern-legitimately-U.S. corporations overseas in
such diverse areas as employment discrimination,213 antitrust, 214 trade and
210 Duff, supra note 103, at 43.
211 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013).
2 12 Morrison v. Nat'l Australian Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
2 13 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012), as amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 109(b), 105 Stat. 1071. The U.S. Supreme Court had invoked the presumption
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economic sanctions, 215 money laundering, 216 and of course, bribery.217
Supreme Court jurisprudence notwithstanding, Congress's constitutional
authority to regulate foreign commerce is indeed alive and well.218
And we should expect Congress to exercise that authority with increasing,
rather than decreasing frequency, as U.S. companies increasingly invest in
foreign markets. Where those markets' legal regimes remain nascent, the
capital-exporting country bears a substantial burden. Whether foreign
investment in developing countries inures to the latter's good, or ill, depends
in large measure on the careful enforcement of extraterritorial corporate
criminal law.
This Article sounds a note both cautious and optimistic. Familiar modes of
criminal punishment-general deterrence guided by the utility calculations and
incentive adjustments of law and economics-will not carry the day. In any
area of corporate conduct that host countries and other capital exporters fail to
effectively regulate, our own deterrence efforts will frequently make matters
worse. But the solution, perhaps surprisingly, has been there all along.
Restorative justice provides an alternative paradigm of criminal punishment
with already well-established authorization under the U.S. Constitution, the
Guidelines, and a decades-old DOJ practice. It could restore overseas victims
through both remediation and prevention, and would help ensure that our
foreign investment promotes, rather than impedes, the growth of sustainable
institutions. The remedy this Article proposes is thus already completely legal
under federal law. It requires no more for its immediate adoption than our
government's informed resolve.
against territoriality to hold that Title VII did not so apply. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
499 U.S. 244 (1991). That same year, Congress responded by amending both Title VII and
the ADA to expressly apply extraterritorially. See Spalding, The Irony, supra note 12, at
383-85.
2 14 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2012).215 The two principal statutes are the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-223, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707, and the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50
App. U.S.C.A. §§ 1-39, 41-44 (West 2014).2 16 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (2012); Bank
Secrecy Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1951-1959, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5314, 5316-5332 (2012).
217 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494,
amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 and by International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
218 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See generally Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign
Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REv. 949 (2010) (discussing the scope of congressional
authority to regulate foreign commerce).
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